Tapol bulletin no, 152, May 1999 by unknown
ISSN 1356-1154 
The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 152 May 1999 
Mass killings sweep across East Timor 
In the first half of April, there were three massacres in East Timor, in Liquisa, Dili and Suai. All are 
part of Operasi Sapu Jagad, the military operation designed by ABRI. In a combined operation by 
para-military death-squads and ABRI troops, East Timorese civilians were butchered. For these kill-
ers nothing is sacred; church sanctuaries were attacked and Bishop Be/o's convoy was ambushed. 
The killing spree, the first major operation of Operasi 
Sapu Jagad or Global Clean-Sweep Operation (see fol-
lowing article), started in the Liquisa sub-district on 4 April 
in a village called Dato, three kms west of Liquisa town. 
Two dozen members of the newly-established pro-
integration para-military group BMP (Besi Merah Putih, 
Red-and-White Iron) attacked the village, known to_ be a 
bastion of pro-independence supporters. They attacked and 
destroyed the house of the village head. The attacking 
force came trom Maubara to the west where pro-
integration forces were in control. The Dato villagers man-
aged to chase the BMP group away and they fled to the 
headquarters of Koramil, the sub-district military com-
mand. 
Early next morning, an attack was launched on Dato 
from two directions by the BMP para-military thugs backed 
this time by soldiers from Koramil. The BMP were armed 
with standard ABRI weapons including Ml 6s, AKs and 
SKS semi-automatic rifles. Five people were killed and 
eight were seriously injured. A dozen houses in the villages 
were razed to the ground. Two priests from nearby Liquisa 
tried in vain to calm the situation by holding discussions 
with the Koramil commander. Most of the terrorised vil-
lagers fled and sought refuge in the Liquisa church. 
Slaughter in the church 
On the next day, 6 April,an even bigger force launched 
an attack on Liquisa church where two thousand refugees, 
many fleeing from the attack on Dato were taking refuge. 
This time, the attacking force consisted of soldiers from 
Battalion 142, from Kodim 1639 Liquisa, from Koramil 
Liquisa, police and Brimob troops as well as BMP death-
squads led by Eurico Guterres. The two priests were taken 
from the church to the local military command and shortly 
after, the attack started. Under the protection of Brimob 
troops surrounding the church who fired into the air, the 
para-militaries started shooting into the church. A tear gas 
grenade was thrown into the church and the refugees taking 
sanctuary there scattered, trying to escape from the build-
ing. The scores of people trapped inside and outside the 
church were then set upon by men armed with knives, ma-
chetes and firearms and mercilessly stabbed, hacked and 
shot to death. The reports from human rights groups in Dili 
describe the sheer horror of that moment. 
The parish priest, Fr Rafael dos Santos, published an 
account of what happened, explaining that the sadistic 
brutalities commenced after he and another priest had been 
removed from the premises and taken to the local military 
command. 'Their aim,' he said, 'was to murder all the peo-
ple in the church.' When he returned a few hours later, all 
the bodies had been removed. 'There was blood everv-
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where and my bedroom was full of blood. The Indonesian 
armed forces and government must be held responsible for 
the massacre at Liquisa church,' he said. [Suara Timar 
Timur, 9 April] 
The Liquisa massacre is undoubtedly the worst human 
rights atrocity to have struck the people of East Timor 
since the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991. While Bishop Belo 
sticks to a figure of 25 deaths, based on the number of 
corpses heaped outside the church, human rights groups 
have compiled a list of 57 dead and 35 wounded. Fourteen 
more people are reported as having disappeared. 
(MPO), the pro-autonomy militia, the structure headed .by 
War Commander Joao Tavares and his deputy Eunco 
Gutteres. The rally was held outside the governor's office 
and attended by Governor Abilio Soares, military com-
mander Colonel Tono Suratman, chief of Police Colonel 
Timbul Silaen and other government and military officials. 
Members of para-military death-squads from other parts of 
East Timor were present The large crowd consisted mainly 
of local residents trucked in from the suburbs of Dili who 
had been summoned from their houses by soldiers at local 
army commands and ordered to attend the rally. 
Tavares said the pro-autonomy militias had a history 
dating back to 1975 of supporting the Indonesian invaders 
against FRET/LIN. In a speech full of venom and hatred, 
- - ----------'------. Guterres said it was the duty of the para-
militaries to deal with the 'defilers' of 
integration. 'As from today, I order all 
pro-integration militia to clean up the 
defilers of integration. Arrest and kill 
them if necessary. I, Eurico Guterres. 
will take full responsibility.' He then 
declared that the home of Manuel Carra-
calao in Dili was the main target of the 
day's operations. Guterres is a close as-
sociate of the disgraced Lt General 
Prabowo and the elite force, Kopassus. 
Formerly chief of Carda Paksi, a youth 
killer squad set up at the instigation of 
Prabowo, Guterres now heads a para-
military group called Aitarak (the Tetum 
word for 'thorn') which is based in Dili 
and liaises constantly with SGL the in-
telligence network of Kopassus. 
Following the rally, the paras ca-
, reered around the town, shooting at ran-
Distress among the people in Liq-i,...," 
-dom into the air terrifying inhabitants, 
and attacking a number of houses and 
buildings connected with pro-
independence activities, during the 
Later two army trucks drove up to the church com-
pound and soldiers loaded the corpses to betaken to an un-
known destination for mass burial. 
On the following Sunday, Bishop Belo went to Liquisa 
for Mass but when he arrived, the church was empty as 
people were still too afraid to venture from their homes. He 
had never before found a church empty when he arrived to 
take a Mass. He asked for the church bell to be rung and 
gradually several hundred brave souls turned up. Later, on 
the way back to Dili, the Bishop's convoy, with a number 
of Indonesian and foreign journalists, was attacked. Rocks 
were tossed into the cars, one of which nearly killed John 
Aglionby, correspondent of The Guardian in Jakarta. 
The attack on Liquisa church was an attempt to spread 
the influence of para-militaries westward from Maubara to 
Liquisa where pro-independence support is strong. It was 
also aimed at terrifying East Timorese into accepting the 
will of pro-integration forces and a warning to Dili, little 
more than a hundred kilometres to the east, that it was next 
on the hit-list. 
The Dili massacre 
Eleven days later, on 17 April, the capital Dili was the 
chosen target of Operasi Sapu Jagad. The day of horror 
started with a rally convened by the Milisi Pro-Otonomi 
course of which several people were kiHed. One target was 
the CNR T office which had been vacated following the 
Liquisa massacre, another the home of CNRT's Dili chief, 
Leandro Isaak and the home of David Diaz Ximenes, an-
other top CNRT activist. 
In the afternoon, the paras went to the home of Manuel 
Carrascalao, a well-known businessman, formerly a mem-
ber of the local assembly who has become vociferously 
pro-independence. His younger brother, Mario, served as 
governor of East Timor for ten years. Several years ago, 
Manuel and others like him who had formerly been pro-
Indonesia, set up the Movement for East Timorese Unity 
and Reconciliation (GRPRTT), the secretariat of which is 
in his home. More recently he has also acted as spokesper-
son for the CNRT in Dili. 
In preparation for the attack, roads leading to the house 
were blocked off. Shortly before the attack, Manuel Mar-
rascalao and his daughter Chris had left the house to go to 
the military commander's office to warn him that the paras 
were causing havoc in the capital and were likely to attack 
their home. Colonel Tono Suratman who clearly knew 
what was going on as he had a few hours earlier, attended 
the rally at which MPO leader Guterres called for pro-
independence people to be killed, told Manuel. 'We have 
to be neutral. You Timorese must sort this out yourselves.' 
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There were about 170 people taking refuge at the Car-
rascalao home. The attack was unrelenting; many people 
were slain in cold blood, including women, children and 
babies. Among the dead was Manuelito Carrascalao, the 
17-year-old adopted son of Manuel who had been doing 
what he could to protect the refugees. He was shot in the 
head, stabbed in the stomach and had his shoulder sliced. 
Several harrowing accounts of the sadistic killings in-
side the house have been given by survivors, one by a man 
who was gravely wounded but was not done to death as 
were other wounded people, because he pretended to be 
dead. He said he saw women being shot and slashed and 
babies snatched from their mothers, then held by the feet 
and their heads smashed against the wall. 
Irish Foreign Minister in Dili 
It so happened that the Irish Foreign Minister, David 
Andrews, arrived in Dili on a scheduled visit just as these 
terrible events were unfolding. In his entourage was Tom 
Hyland, Ireland's leading East Timor activist. The minister 
was with military commander Suratman when Manuel Car-
rascalao arrived to ask for protection. A few hours later, 
while visiting BishQp Belo, Manuel and Chris Carrascalao 
arrived in great distress to say that Manuelito had been 
killed. He decided to cut short his visit to Dili and return 
immediately to Jakarta to start alerting other world leaders 
about the terrible events in Dili. 
The death toll from Dili's nightmare on 17 April cannot 
be accurately determined because many of the bodies as 
well as the wounded at the Carrascalao home were re-
moved by the army to unknown destinations. The generally 
accepted figure is that thirty people were slain in a day of 
unbridled evil. Two days later, Bishop Belo was allowed to 
visit the hospital where twelve bodies were being kept, to 
say prayers and visit the many wounded. It took several 
days before the Carrascalao family were able to take pos-
session of Manuelito's body for burial. It is not clear 
whether the other bodies were buried in a mass grave or 
returned to the families. 
Most of the wounded were treated in Motael Clinic, 
with families doing what they could to prevent relatives 
from being treated at the military hospital, Wira Husada. 
There is a severe shortage of surgeons and medication to 
cope with scores of people wounded in Liquisa, Dili and 
elsewhere. Since the massacres, Motael's only surgeon has 
been joined by four volunteer doctors to help cope with the 
emergency. 
Wiranto pays a visit 
With many governments and world leaders as well as 
the UN secretary-general loudly condemning the slaughter 
and holding the Indonesian armed forces responsible for 
these events, ABRI commander-in-chief General Wiranto 
made a hurried visit to Dili for damage limitation purposes. 
While calls intensified for the para-militaries to be dis-
armed and disbanded, he made it clear that arms supplied 
by ABRI to these death-squads would not be withdrawn. 
All that he could come up with was the ceremonial 
signing of a so-called peace accord between 'the two war-
ring factions'. In fact there is only one warring faction in 
East Timor, the para-militaries and their ABRI backers and 
manipulators. The signatories were from the pro-
integration leaders and from the CNR T as well as from the 
East Timor military and police chiefs. The document is not 
worth the paper it was written on. 
EASTTIMOR 
The Suai killings 
At the time the peace accord was being signed in Dili, 
more killings were underway in Suai, a town located in the 
south-west corner of East Timor, not far from the border 
with West Timor. Information about these killings is 
sketchy because of communications difficulties and the 
fact that the area has been sealed off. There are reports of 
scores of people disappearing and bodies being thrown into 
a local river, some of them severely mutilated or decapi-
tated. The local parish priest, Fr Hilario has told some call-
ers that the death toll is probably as high as one hundred 
but he has only been able to identify a smaller number of 
victims by name. The family of one victim, Abilio Pires, 
told relatives abroad that his body was sighted lying in a 
field several days after he went missing but they were too 
afraid to go out and take it home. 
Killings in Ermera 
Ermera, in one of East Timor's most prosperous re-
gions, benefits from a lucrative trade in coffee. It lies not 
far from Dili, to the south-east, and hence is more accessi-
ble to visiting foreign journalists. 
Visiting the region for The Observer, John Aglionby 
was informed that as Wiranto's peace accord was being 
signed in Dili on 21 April, a village chief, Bartholemew 
Borromeu was being beaten to death by local army offi-
cers. 'His skull was completely smashed,' said the local 
priest Fr Sancho Amaral. He was also the local representa-
tive of the CNRT, according to the priest, and had survived 
a torture session the previous Sunday. 'It's all about in-
timidation,' he said. 
A vicious campaign of terror by the military had been 
underway for two weeks already. 'People are being taken 
away every day to be interrogated and beaten,' the priest 
said, and a massacre had occurred in the remote village of 
Talimoro. A bus driver said that at least six people are 
known to have been killed there, 'but everyone is too 
frightened to go and find out what really happened'. Others 
believe the death toll there could be as high as twelve. 
Since then, at least seven people have been killed in Er-
mera, in a campaign to pick off CNRT leaders. They in-
clude a local councillor, Antonio da Lima who was shot 
in the village of Gleno, followed in the next few days by 
four more deaths. 'They were all killed by soldiers or East 
Timorese territorial troops,' said Fr Amaral. He described 
the past few weeks as the worst in his two and a half years 
in Ermera. [The Observer, 25 April 1999] 
Five shot dead in Cailaco 
Following an attack by FALINTIL on 13 April when a 
pro-integration figure Manuel Soares Gama in Cailaco, 
Bobonaro district was killed, the local military commander 
in Bobonaro, Lt-Colonel Burhanudin Siagian rounded up 
five people in the district and shot them dead in the pres-
ence of the local administration head and the police chief. 
This military commander who operates in liaison with the 
Halilintar para-military death squad is quoted elsewhere in 
this issue (see next item) as saying he will stop at nothing 
to sabotage the Habibie initiative on East Timor. • 
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ABRI and the para-military death squads 
On 17 April a wave of terror struck the people of Dili, the capital of East Timor. Truckloads of 
armed pro-integrasi thugs entered the capital for a rally at the governor's office and later wen~ on 
the rampage, attacking the homes of pro-independence supporters. Eye-witnesses confirm the direct 
involvement of Indonesian security officers in the operation. 
At least a thousand members 
of para-military death squads 
roamed the streets of Dili on that 
day, brandishing firearms and 
machetes. Eurico Gutteres, dep-
uty war commander of the pro-
integration forces, as he is called, 
told his followers to use violence 
if necessary to cleanse the terri-
tory of pro-independence groups. 
Several reports confirm that In-
donesian soldiers and policemen 
were among the para-militaries. 
Soldiers and police on duty as 
the violence spread through the 
city stood by watching and 
cheering as people were killed 
and houses ransacked. At least 
thirty people were killed, in-
cluding Manuelito, the adopted 
son of Manuel Carrascalao, a 
prominent pro-independence 
politician and spokesperson of 
the CNRT. 
In the weeks leading up to 17 
April, the violent activities of 
para-military/ABRI death squads 
Show of force in front of the governor's office by the para-military 
escalated dramatically. New groups emerged bearing fear-
some names like Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Iron), 
Mahidi (Dead or Alive for Indonesia) and Darah Merah 
(Red Blood). Their leaflets are written in strident, milita-
ristic language with undisguised calls for their enemies to 
be annihilated. 
The Dili campaign of terror occurred 11 days after a 
church compound in Liquisa full of refugees was attacked 
by para-military/ABRI forces, killing at least 25 villagers. 
The new groups differ in important respects from older 
para-military gangs used for years as auxiliary units by the 
Indonesian territorial forces. The groups that have emerged 
since 27 January when President Habibie announced that 
the East Timorese would be given a choice about their fu-
ture are part of a clear military strategy. 
Operasi Sapu Jagad 
The strategy is being implemented by means of an op-
eration code-named Operasi Sapu Jagad (Global Clean-
Sweep Operation). The name is Sanskrit, the language of-
ten used by the army and hardly likely to be chosen by 
Timorese. The aim of Global Clean-Sweep Operation is to 
assert that East Timor's integration with Indonesia is irre-
versible and anyone supporting independence must be dealt 
with. Para-military death squads have been created, trained 
and armed to front the operation and make it look as 
though it is an East Timorese campaign. Their statements 
are belligerent in the extreme and they have warned all 
Timorese civil servants who support independence to 
abandon their homes and surrender the facilities they enjoy 
as Indonesian civil servants. ABRI planned the operation 
and is in command of its implementation. 
The events on 17 April were directed primarily against 
those working for the Indonesian administration while 
openly supporting independence as well as those who for-
merly sided with Indonesia but subsequent become pro-
independence advocates. Since 27 January, more and more 
East Timorese officials came out in support of independ-
ence, encouraged by the change in the political climate to 
express openly what they had been feeling for years. 
In earlier acts of terror, several highly-placed civil ser-
vants were targeted. During an incident in Maubara on 2 
February, the deputy-head of the Liquisa DPRD (local as-
sembly) was attacked by members of Besi Merah Putih. 
Another victim was Carlos Alberto, a senior official at the 
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plantations office in Liquisa. The editorial office of the 
Dili-based daily, Suara Timar Timur was destroyed on 17 
April. The paper had become increasingly even-handed 
and published Father Rafael's harrowing account of the 
Liquisa tragedy which occurred on 6 April. The paramili-
tary/ ABRI accused STT of being the mouthpiece for pro-
independence forces. 
Operasi Sapu Jagad has three main aims. The first is to 
create the impression that there is a civil war in East Timor. 
Hard-liners in ABRI and the Indonesian government have 
argued that a referendum in East Timor is a recipe for civil 
war and to prove it, terrorist actions have been launched, 
using the para-militaries. But recruitment has been diffi-
cult. Many villagers fled their homes rather than join, while 
many of those who joined did so unwillingly or out of fear. 
There is reason to believe that some para-military recruits 
are from West Timor. TV footage shows well-trained men 
wielding semi-automatic rifles, meaning that they received 
combat training in Java from ABRI officers. 
The second objective is to sabotage the ballot made 
possible by Habibie's initiative which infuriated many of 
the political elite in Jakarta, not least key factions in ABRI. 
Stunned at first by the Habibie initiative, it took time for 
them to muster their forces but now, the hopes sparked by 
Habibie's offer to the Timorese have been overwhelmed by 
the brutality of the para-militaries/ABRI on the ground. 
The fact that ABRI officers openly participate in or lead 
Sapu Jagad operations suggests that important sections 
within the Indonesian administration also support it. 
The third objective is to destroy the CNRT, the Na-
tional Council of Timorese Resistance. The more open po-
litical atmosphere in East Timor that followed the fall of 
Suharto encouraged many groups, including the CNRT, to 
abandon clandestinity and organise publicly. The CNRT 
opened an office in Dili. Many local CNRT officials in the 
localities have been targeted in the recent terror. There are 
also reports of a sustained attack by more than a thousand 
regular troops on FALINTIL bases in Aileu and Manatuto. 
Divisions within ABRI over Timor 
ABRI is clearly split on many issues and none is more 
divisive than East Timor. The largest faction, including 
those who planned and are executing Operasi Sapu Jagad, 
hold the view that East Timor' s integration is irreversible. 
They include a number of local military commanders in 
East Timor including Liquisa Kodim 1638 (district military 
command) commander, Lt Colonel Asep Kuswanto and 
Ermera Kodim 1637 commander, Lt Colonel Muhammad 
Nur. Another is Lt Colonel Burhanudin Siagian, com-
mander of Bobonaro Kodim. A contact recently had a chat 
with this commander at a roadside stall in Batugede. He 
was with twenty paras from the Halilintar death squad and 
told our source that he could not accept the Habibie deci-
sion and would do whatever necessary to prevent a change 
in the status quo in East Timor. At Dili headquarters, the 
key figure is Colonel Mudjiono, deputy-commander of 
Wira Dharma Korem 164. (This officer's presence in East 
Timor is curious as there is no tradition for korems to have 
deputy commanders ). 
Top generals who play a particularly active role include 
Major-General Adam Damiri, commander of the Udayana 
Territorial Military Command which includes East Timor, 
and Lt-General Tyasno Sudarso, the head of BIA, military 
intelligence. His predecessor at BIA, Lt-General Zacky 
Anwar Makarim who spent many years as an intelligence 
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officer in East Timor, was in Dili on 17 April and sources 
now say that he was probably in overall charge of the hor-
rific events on that day. Prominent East Timor veterans, 
now retired, including Generals Benny Murdani and Tri 
Sutrisno, as well as the sacked Lt General Prabowo are also 
known to be part of this faction, as well as Lt General 
Yunus Yosfiah, Information Minister in the Habibie cabi-
net who has been implicated in the murder of five televi-
sion journalists in Balibo in October 1975. 
The involvement of top military intelligence officers 
strongly suggests that Operasi Sapu Jagad is a military 
intelligence operation. It is reminiscent of the Indonesian 
invasion of East Timor in 1975. That started with an intel-
ligence operation code-named Operasi Komodo to destabi-
lise the region and give the impression that pro-Indonesian 
forces among the East Timorese were substantial. History 
often repeats itself; in East Timor it is doing so with a 
vengeance. 
Another faction argues against letting East Timor go 
because ABRI has made huge sacrifices, losing thousands 
of men in combat in East Timor. They will take a lot of 
convincing before accepting that the invasion and occupa-
tion was a grievous mistake of the previous government 
and for the sake of justice and peace, the people of East 
Timor should be allowed to determine their own future. 
They should understand that clinging on to East Timor can 
only mean yet more sacrifices by Indonesian soldiers. 
The present ABRI leadership under Wiranto have ac-
cepted President Habibie's policy of letting the East 
Timorese choose. But although they hold key positions at 
the top, their standing within ABRI is very weak. lt·will 
depend on the political will of the Habibie government plus 
pressure from civil society to persuade this group to stick 
to its position. 
... ____ _ 
Another tiny group in ABRI now accept that Indone-
sia's annexation of East Timor is colonialism and Indone-
sia should leave East Timor as soon as possible. This view 
has been publicly expressed by retired Lt-General Hasnan 
Habib and is also shared by a small group of serving offi-
cers. This is the only faction that has broken with the para-
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digm of Suharto' s New Order. It will take time before this 
group becomes an influential voice among ABRI officers. 
But in addition to the three objectives of Operasi Sapu 
Jagad already mentioned, there is another which goes be-
yond the question of East Timar, that of stirring up trouble 
in Indonesia which is happening in so many parts of the 
country. Disturbances in East Timer are particularly useful 
in this connection because the issue is such a prominent 
one on the international agenda. 
The dispute over East Timor is one of the major is-
sues rocking the present administration. If both Habibie 
and Wiranto can be shown to be incapable of maintain-
ing order in East Timor, those plotting for their removal 
will have a ' legitimate' reason to make a move. It is not 
too far-fetched to think of a scenario that might shatter 
the positions of either or both these men. 
Where does Wiranto stand? 
General Wiranto, commander-in-chief of ABRI ex-
pressed support for the Habibie initiative on 27 January. 
This was interpreted by many in the army as showing a 
lack of commitment on his part to the army's East Timor 
project. His career in the army owes little to the annexa-
tion, never having served in the territory. He is not from 
the elite force, Kopassus and has never been involved in 
intelligence operations, unlike virtually all East Timor vet-
erans. His attitude was seen as a betrayal of the army's 
tens of thousands killed over the past 23 years. 
He is unlikely to have been instrumental in the recruit-
ing and arming of the para-militaries but has done nothing 
to respond to the many calls from governments to disarm 
and disband them. He has reportedly told foreign diplomats 
that he 'could easily' disarm them so why has he done 
nothing? The answer lies in his lack of authority within 
ABRI, his inability to resolve the many conflicts within his 
ranks. But that does not absolve him from responsibility for 
what has happened. 
The position of the resistance 
President Habibie's decision to offer the Timorese a 
choice was a breakthrough but his time schedule did not 
correspond with the CNRT's plan for the transition. 
Habibie has said that if the East Timorese opt for inde-
pendence, East Timer's separation will happen be~o!e the 
millenium. The CNRT leaders had planned a trans1t1on of 
five to ten years, justifiably arguing that the Indonesian 
occupation has wrought terrible havoc on East Timorese 
civil society and the country's physical resources. Bishop 
Belo's preferred transition period was even longer. The 
Habibie proposal forced CNRT leaders to opt for a three to 
five year transition under UN auspices. 
But the question of transition is minor compared to that 
of security which is far more complex and fraught with 
danger. Suharto's downfall, followed by Habibie's offer 
accelerated the pace of political developments in East 
Timor. The economic crisis has hit everybody hard and the 
political changes have caused profound upheavals. The 
more than 20,000 Indonesian civil servants working in East 
Timer felt abandoned by Jakarta, with many demanding to 
return home. They have often been the target of East 
Timorese anger, channelling their intense anti-Indonesia 
feelings towards innocent civilians. The more than 20,000 
Indonesian soldiers also fe[t betrayed and morale among 
the troops has sunk to an all-time low. 
East Timorese have been able to express their pro-
independence feelings openly. The stu~ent moveme~t has 
been very active organising the populat10n down to village 
level, in preparation for a referendum. F~r t~e best part of 
1998, things went well but dark forces withm ABRI even-
tually struck back. 
As the security situation worsened and the death toll 
rose inexorably, Xanana Gusmao displayed tru~ _statesman-
ship by doing what he could to ~afeguard stab.ihty and se-
curity. F ALINTIL, the armed wmg of the resi~tance, ~as 
ordered to stopped their operations and people i.n the citi~s 
were told to refrain from organising rallies. This goodwtll 
found no response from Indonesia. The para-military forces 
held a rally early in March to form a pro-integrasi force 
under Joao Tavares as panglima perang (~ar C?1:11man?er). 
Tavares has collaborated with the Indonesian m1htary smce 
1975. Eurico Guterres was appointed deputy panglima 
perang. Towards the end of March, the Udayana military 
commander, Major-General Adam Damiri, convened a 
meeting of the main para-military leaders at his headquar-
ters in Bali and announced that he had resources to fund a 
pro-integrasi force of two thousand men. 
Meanwhile the violent activities of the para-
military/ ABRI had been escalating throughout March and 
early April.. Thousands of East Timorese villagers, in par-
ticular in the western region, fled as para-militaries tried to 
force the menfolk to join them. By 9 April human rights 
groups in Dili had monitored forty fatalities and 22 injured 
either shot or stabbed, 77 victims of torture, three missing 
and several cases of rape. More than 18,000 people had 
fled their homes. 
Even with terror mounting, the CNRT kept to its cool, 
determined not to be drawn into major conflict.. Xanana 
responded to a request from Joao Tavares for a meeting 
and agreed that they could work together to seek a peaceful 
solution a pledge that was soon betrayed by Tavares. The 
para-military/ABRI forces continued with their campaign 
of terror and by early April they controlled all roads into 
West Timor; many villages in the western part of East 
Timer had been abandoned by terrified villagers. On 3 
April, Udayana commander Major-General Adam Damiri 
spoke aggressively during a press conference in Dili about 
the army's warlike intentions in East Timor. Two days 
later, Xanana received news that four people had been 
killed by the paras in Liquisa district. The pressure on 
Xanana from his countrymen and women became intense 
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Referendum calls reverberate in Washington 
Many leading Acehnese intellectuals and activists came together in Washington to consider the 
deepening crisis in Ac eh. They expressed support for a referendum to determine the future status of 
their land. The Congressional Caucus on Human Rights held a briefing on Aceh a few days later. 
For the first time ever, the problems of Aceh have reverberated in the US capital. 
The one-day conference in Washington on 3 April, 
which was attended by 140 people, took place against the 
background of the quickening pace of change in Aceh 
where escalating human rights violations and army brutali-
ties have turned more and more Acehnese against their 
links with Jakarta. The participants included senior profes-
sors, politicians, human rights activists and representatives 
of several international human rights NGOs. The confer-
ence, entitled The Future Integration of Indonesia: Focus 
on Aceh, was held at the American University in collabo-
ration with the Student Association for a Burmese Coali-
tion and was convened by the International Forum on Aceh 
(IFA) which came into existence following a meeting on 
Aceh held in New York last December. 
The dominating theme in most of the contributions was 
the need for a referendum to allow the Acehnese people to 
decide whether they wanted Aceh to be an autonomous 
province, a state within a Federal Indonesia or an inde-
pendent state. Judging from almost all of the speeches, it 
was clear that there is growing alienation from the Repub-
lic of Indonesia. The speakers unanimously condemned the 
continuing atrocities committed by the Indonesian security 
forces, and called for the prosecution of soldiers responsi-
ble for almost ten years of terror and persecution when 
Aceh was treated as a daerah operasi militer (DOM) or 
military operation zone, and for the many atrocities perpe-
trated by the army since DOM was lifted in August 1998. 
The Indonesian embassy in Washington was invited to 
send a speaker but turned down the invitation although 
members of the embassy staff were spotted in the audience. 
With Aceh now becoming such a 'troublespot' for Jakarta, 
the authorities at home were clearly embarrassed by the 
prospect of being confronted with demands threatening its 
hold one of its most profitable, revenue-raising regions. 
Tengku Hasan di Tiro of the Aceh/Sumatra National 
Liberation Front (ASNLF) was also invited to attend but 
was unable to come due to ill health. 
Professors air their views 
Of the several university professors who spoke, only 
Professor Ibrahim Alfian of Gadjah Mada University, 
Yogyakarta, in Central Java, spoke out in favour or contin-
ued integration with Indonesia, highlighting the support 
Aceh had afforded to the Republic of Indonesia under its 
first president, Sukarno, in the early years of its existence. 
By contrast, Professor Abdullah Ali of Syiah Kuala 
University in Banda Aceh spoke of the strategic position of 
Aceh and the growing dissatisfaction among its people 
which had led so rapidly to the demand for a referendum, 
an idea that had never before been broached. He described 
a meeting recently between Syamsudin Mahmud,governor 
of Aceh, and senior personalities where it was agreed that 
the situation had reached crisis point. The failure of the 
central government to respond to public opinion had re-
sulted in growing support for federation or a referendum. 
Aguswandi assisted by Sidney Jones 
Dr Husaini Hasan, leader of the Aceh Liberation 
Front, totally rejected either autonomy or federation. 
Aceh's treatment as a 'Special Region' (granted in the 
1950s to end the revolt by Daud Beureuh) was a tactic to 
distract the people from their legitimate demand for inde-
pendence. To accept becoming a state in a federated re-
public would deprive the Acehnese of their identity as a 
nation. Independence was the only alternative acceptable to 
the Acehnese, he said. 
Dr Husaini who now lives as an exile in Sweden, said 
that he had spent three years in the bush with Aceh Mer-
deka and had never used violence. He had spent much of 
the time carting round stencil machines and typewriters to 
spread the word. 'The only time my hands have ever been 
stained with blood is when I treat my patients as a gynae-
cologist.' · 
Another voice supporting outright indepenqence came 
from Professor Lukman Thaib, a professor.-of political 
science at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. · He spoke of 
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the efforts of Tengku Hasan di Tiro, leader of the 
Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front, to raise the issue 
at the UN by means of putting it onto the agenda of 
ECOSOC as a formal request from Hasan di Tiro had been 
circulated as an ECOSOC document. 
During a question and answer session following Dr Lu-
kan ' s presentation, Jaffar, a leading activist in the !FA re-
sponsible for convening the Washington event, wanted to 
make it clear that there is no organisational connection 
between it and the ASNLF and that the IFA is totally dedi-
cated to non-violent actions . 
Student leaders speak out 
The presence of two student leaders coming direct from 
Aceh gave the Washington conference its most distinctive 
flavour, as the student movement is in the forefront of the 
movement calling for a referendum. The issue exploded 
onto the scene following a student conference in Banda 
Aceh at the end of January this year and has snowballed 
ever since. 
The first to speak was Aguswandi, general sec-
retary of SMUR, Student Solidarity for a Referen-
dum. He came to the rostrum wearing a headband 
with the word, Referendum and addressed the meet-
ing with passion. He spoke at length about the 
atrocities perpetrated by the armed forces in the past 
few months. People had drawn the conclusion that 
the government has no desire to resolve the crisis, 
and that there was no reason to expect anything any-
more from Jakarta. 
'Sovereignty must be speedily restored to the 
people of Aceh,' he said. This had strengthened peo-
ple's desire for independence. In the opinion of the 
students, the best way to achieve this was by means 
of a referendum because this was the non-violent way 
forward. 'A referendum is the wisest way forward, 
the safest, most democratic and realistic way,' he 
said. 
The other student leader to speak was Radhi 
Darmansyah, a member of the Presidium of FAR-
M/DIA, the Action Forum for Reform of Islamic Stu-
dents in the Special District of Aceh, who described 
the brutalities of the armed forces in Aceh as an act of 
genocide. This was evident from the systematic na-
ture of their military operations: the destruction by means 
of atrocities of the family structure creating social stress for 
children, the destruction of people's livelihoods leading to 
widespread impoverishment, the annihilation of many of 
the younger generation, and the use of torture, disappear-
ances in total disregard of the people's legal, political, so-
cial and cultural rights. 
He outlined three necessary steps: reject the new mili-
tary command for the region of Aceh, cancel the general 
elections because they could not be conducted democrati-
cally and peacefully but would become a source of conflict 
and yet more disturbances, and the presence in Aceh of 
international agencies to monitor the human rights situa-
tion. He appealed in particular to the International Red 
Cross, the UN's High Commission for Refugees and Am-
nesty International to send representatives. He also hoped 
that the international community would support a referen·· 
dum in Aceh as the wisest and most democratic solution. 
An Indonesian MP, Ors Ghazali Abbas, who sits in 
Parliament for the Muslim party, the PPP, said he ~elt 
deeply concerned about his people. ' I came here,' he sa~d, 
' to discuss how to achieve a peaceful and prosperous hfe 
and to free the people from fear. If all this could be 
achieved, we could say that the people enjoyed freedom 
but de facto, ' he said, 'the Acehnese were not yet free.' 
He concluded his speech with the rendition of an 
Acehnese song which deeply moved all the Acehnese pres-
ent. 
International NGOs offer support 
Speaking on behalf of TAPOL, Carmel Budiardjo 
said that we were at a 'turning point in the struggle of the 
Acehnese people'. TA POL and other human rights organi-
sations like Amnesty International and Asia Watch (now 
Human Right Watch/Asia) had been reporting the atrocities 
sirice the early 1990s when DOM was in full swing but 
Western governments ignored the issue. Although DOM 
has been lifted last August, the repression had continued, 
reaching a climax with the killings in Idi Cut on 3 Febru-
ary. She described the present status of military operations 
Some of the participants of the Aceh conference during 
the Congressional Caucus on Human Rights in Wash-
ington D.C. 
as DOM Mark-II. The ldi Cut massacre, more than any 
other incident, had caused the Acehnese to question their 
position within the Indonesian Republic. 
The brutalities perpetrated by members of ABRI are 
largely to blame for pushing the people of Aceh into a 
more openly hostile attitude towards Indonesia, she said. 
Armies bent on repression will never learn, they do not 
understand that they provide the best schooling for com-
mitment to a nationalist cause. She said that the Western 
powers were in favour of keeping Indonesia together, as 
the best way to exploit its abundant natural resources, in-
cluding those in Aceh. 
She noted the growing opposition in Aceh to creating a 
new Ko~am a~d the call ~or t~e withdrawal of all military 
forces, mcludmg the terntonal army. This would mean 
dismantling military commands down to the village level. 
'This spells out what ending the dwifungsi really means .... 
It is not just ending the army's control of key positions in 
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executive and legislative bodies but insisting on the armed 
forces' role being limited to defending the country against 
external attack, she said. 
Sidney Jones of Human Rights Watch focused her re-
marks on the problems which campaigning for a referen-
dum is likely to confront. There were several regions in 
Indonesia confronting similar grievances: human rights 
violations, cultural infringements, transmigration and the 
theft of natural resources. The Indonesian state was facing 
pressure from many quarters in addition to Aceh. This 
might well harden the attitude of the central government to 
calls for separation. 
She raised some key questions. If East Timor obtained 
its independence, would this make things easier for Aceh? 
She had her doubts. She also warned that it would be ex-
tremely difficult to persuade the UN to become involved in 
conducting a referendum in Aceh, after having devoted so 
much energy to solving the question of East Timor. 
Jana Mason of the US Committee for Refugees gave a 
very useful address on the problems confronted by 
Acehnese political refugees, regarding which the Commit-
tee has published a report entitled : The 'Least Risky Solu-
tion ': Malaysia 's Detention and Deportaion of Acehnese 
Asylum Seekers. [Copies available from US Committee for 
Refugees, 1717 Massachusetts A venue NW, Suite 200, 
Washington DC 20036.] 
The texts of most of the speeches are available on the 
IF A website, see www .aceh.org/forum/dcconference. 
In Aceh, Habibie visit leads to scuffles 
President Habibie made a five-hour visit to Banda Aceh 
on 26 March in an attempt to calm passions but it was 
hardly a success. After a visit to the governor's office, he 
was whisked off to Baiturahhman Mosque for Friday pray-
ers, followed by a 'dialogue' with a carefully selected 
audience of dignitaries, and he then left straight for the air-
port to return to Jakarta. The day before the visit, the gov-
ernment announced the release of thi11y Acehnese political 
prisoners, an obvious PR move to curry favour. 
Students had been campaigning for days to boycott the 
visit unless he came with a clear decision to hold a referen-
dum in Aceh. On the day of the visit, security forces were 
out in force to prevent thousands of students from crossing 
a bridge to get near the mosque. When students tried to 
break through the barricade, there were scuffles and many 
people were injured. Warning shots were fired and tear-gas 
canisters were fired into crowd; the wind blew the gas 
back, forcing many of the troops to flee. 
Inside the mosque, Habibie delivered a lengthy ad-
dress, offered apologies for past sufferings at the hands of 
the security forces and promised to finance a programme to 
re-build damaged properties, set up new religious schools 
and pay for the burial of some of the victims of DOM vio-
lence. Needless to say, this did not impress the Acehnese. 
Even the governor of the province, Syamsuddin Mahmud, 
Habibie's host, had harsh words to deliver. He said there 
was a sense of deep dissatisfaction in Aceh for past treat-
ment. He went back in history to show why measures taken 
by the centre since 1945 had failed to satisfy the popula-
tion. They had been granted special status in 1959 but a 
law on regional government in 1974 had annulled what 
advantages this had given by suppressing political freedom, 
especially freedom of expression. Anyone who criticised 
the government was accused of rebellion. It was as a con 
sequence of this , he said, that the Aceh Merdeka Move-
ment had emerged. 
Faudri , a student in the audience, told the President 
bluntly that the people did not want any more promises 
from the government because it only prolonged the suffer-
ing. 'What we want is a clear political commitment. The 
only comprehensive solution for Aceh is a referendum,' he 
said [Republika, 27 March] 
Referendum campaign and flag-raising 
The Habibie visit provided the impetus for yet more 
calls for a referendum. The following day, a student or-
ganisation in Medan, the FMPRA, or Student Front to 
Support a Referendum in Aceh, sent a delegation to the 
main TV station. It demanded and was granted time to 
broadcast a statement calling for a referendum. [Kompas, 
28 March] 
A couple of days later, 24 students from several univer-
sities began a hunger strike calling for a referendum and 
rejecting the setting up of a military command in Aceh. It 
was also reported that the chairman and deputy chairman 
of the regional assembly, the DPRD, along with the leader 
of the armed forces faction in the assembly, had all signed 
a statement supporting a referendum. [Waspada, 1 April] 
Since then there have been many demonstrations with 
students and high school pupils scrawling the word 
' referendum' on walls and hanging up banners across 
streets and on buildings. More recently large crowds have 
taken to the streets not only shouting referendum slogans 
but waving the Aceh Merdeka flag and pulling down the 
Indonesian red-and-white national flag. On 24 April, the 
Medan-based daily, Waspada, reported that following a 
bloody incident in Lhokseumawe earlier in the week (see 
below), Aceh Merdeka flags had been unfurled everywhere 
in Aceh 'with no one daring to pull them down'. They have 
appeared not only in cities and suburbs but in many dis-
tricts; in many places leaflets containing the flag have been 
plastered on the walls of houses, on shop windows and on 
road-signs. 
. The banner- and flag-raising incidents.often accompa-
nied by the pulling down of the Indonesian flag has led to 
scuffles some of which have turned violent, between the 
pro-referendum crowds and the security forces. 
AFP described a colourful rally on 18 April when hun-
dreds of people including scores of young children paraded 
through Lhokseumawe' s main avenue for several hours, 
cheered by hundreds of onlookers, waving the Aceh Mer-
deka flag. 
'This was the first time ever that the independence flag 
has been openly displayed,' a resident said. He added that 
most homes in the villages in the northern Aceh district 
were flying the flag. 
The flag has a bright red background contrasting with 
the white crescent and star symbol trapped between two 
thick black horizontal stripes. [AFP, 19 April] 
On 19 April, thousands of high school students went to 
the local military command, Kodim, in Sigli, Pidie to de-
mand that referendum banners that had been torn down be 
restored to their places. The local commander rejected the 
demand and ordered his men to disperse the crowd by 
force. Shots were fired into the air and then in the direction 
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of the crowd; at least seven were injured and many were 
arrested. 
Two shot dead as ferment intensifies 
Two days later, hundreds of students marched to police 
headquarters in Lhokseumawe to demand the release of 
colleagues who had been arrested several days earlier. 
Scuffles broke out as some started pulling down the Indo-
nesian flag at a nearby gas-station. Shots rang out and a 17-
year old student named Ahmadi from a private technical 
high school fell to the ground, mortally wounded. A seven-
year old boy was seriously wounded and many others were 
injured. A police officer was also killed. The police say 
that the shots were fired by unidentified persons. 
Aceh is clearly in the grip of a virtual revolt against Ja .. 
karta. Events are moving rapidly with radical demands be-
ing superseded by even more radical demands. First it was 
calls for justice and the prosecution of army personnel re-
sponsible for the killings during DOM, then came the de-
mand for a referendum and an election boycott, now this 
has turned into Aceh-wide hoisting of the Aceh Merdeka 
flag. The population seem to be telling Jakarta that their 
writ no longer runs in Aceh. 
In such circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how the 
7 June elections will have any relevance. Few people are 
likely to register, making the whole exercise meaningless. 
The security forces are currently tied up in their cam-
paign of terror against the people of East Timor and trying 
vainly to cope with unrest in several parts of the country, 
but they are hardly likely to allow the political ferment in 
Aceh to continue without a harsh clampdown in the com-
ing weeks. * 
A wave of killings in Aceh 
Dozens of civilians have been killed in Aceh in the last few months. The pattern of killings is similar 
to the petrus, an acronym/or pembunuhan misterius, or mysterious killings. In 1983184 thousands 
o/people were killed in cities throughout Java by petrus death-squads. 
The petrus killers were known to be ABRI special units. 
The killings were professionally executed using modern semi-
automatic rifles, standard ABRI weaponry. The victims were 
slain on the streets or in their homes in front of their families. 
Selected soldiers from the red beret unit Kopassus were 
known to be the executioners . 
The killers were described as being military-type, muscu-
lar men with crew-cut hair. The dictator Suharto admitted 
frankly in his autobiography that he had ordered the military 
to deal with organised criminals in a radical way as a 'shock 
therapy' . Petrus has become the model for ABRl's handling 
of its political enemies. During the popular insurrection 
against Suharto in 1998, dozens of activists disappeared. A 
year on, it is feared that most of them have been taken care of 
by special ABRI units. 
Cuak, ABRI spies 
The people killed in Aceh are known to the Acehnese as 
cuak, men who helped ABRI to track down people suspected 
of giving active or passive support to CAM, Cerakan Aceh 
Merdeka, the Free Aceh Movement. From 1989 till August 
1998 Aceh was treated as a military operations region (DOM), 
which turned it into an army occupied territory where law was 
in the hands of the military. Many thousands of innocent 
Acehnese died or disappeared and there are at least 16,000 
orphans and thousands of widows as a result of one decade of 
DOM. 
District military commander of North Aceh, Colonel 
Johnny Wahab has admitted that most of the victims were 
TPO (Tenaga Pembantu Operasi, operational assistants), the 
official ABRl name for cuaks. He alleges that the killings 
have been committed by members of the CPLHT (Cerakan 
Pengacau liar Hasan Tiro, Disruptor Gang of Hasan Tiro), 
ABRl's new name for CAM, the Free Aceh Movement. All 
the killings have occurred in three districts, Pidie, North and 
East Aceh, the districts where most of the DOM atrocities 
occurred. 
Few people accept this version and believe that they are 
the work of petrus killers. Some occur in broad daylight when 
the cuak is shot in a public place. Abdul Wahab Usman, vil-
lage head from Blangpala, Nisam subdistrict in North Aceh. 
was killed on his way to the mosque. Another Blangpala vil-
lager Effendi opened the door of his home early on 29 March 
and was killed by a volley of gunfire. His three-year old son 
rushed to hug his father and was shot in the thigh. 
Story of a Kopassus killer 
The introduction of press freedom after the downfall of 
Suharto has done a great service, removing many of the ta-
boos of the Suharto era. Recently an account appeared in the 
press of a Kopassus officer who said he had killed about a 
hundred people, though he had lost count. Now retired, he is 
known as Dono. He has no remorse for being a member of a 
petrus death squad. As a soldier who served in East Timor he 
says he finds killing easy: 'It isn't difficult for me to carry out 
an order to kill because I once served in East Tim or'. Dono 
went on to say: 'ft 's like killing an East Timorese guerrilla. I 
had only one thought; how to kill an enemy of the state who 
always disrupts stability. No one must escape. Every target 
must get three bullets in lethal parts of the body'. 
Dono explained how the petrus squads were organised. 
The commander g~thered a group of men for an assignment. 
They u.sually met m a hotel; the members of the group were 
from different squads, who usually did not know each other. 
The victim, his house and whereabouts was identified. The 
c?mmander handed out the weapons, often equipped with a 
silencer. The bullets were unregistered. The mission was 
clear, no question of failure - the target had to be killed. If the 
killi~g happened i~ public and people gave chase, the team 
was m.structed t~ kill the witnesses as it was a covert military 
operation. [Media Indonesia, 7 March] 
. The wave of violence in many parts of the Indonesian ar-
c~1pela~o has. escalated in the post-Suharto period; profes-
sional killers hke the Kopassus squads are widely believed to 
be partly responsible for the pre-election wave of violence. 
Many of them could be men like Dono, for whom killing is an 
expression of their loyalty to the state. * 
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Police separated from the armed forces 
On 1 April POLRI, the Indonesian National Police, was separated from ABRI, the Indonesian 
armed forces. This is an important step forward but much more is needed to transform the force into 
a democratic institution in charge of upholding law. 
Some analysts in Jaka11a called the 1 April ceremony an 
April Fool's joke but the fact is that political changes in 
Indonesia compelled the ABRI leadership to make a start 
with this separation. In most countries, there is a strict 
separation between the police force and the army. The po-
lice are responsible for upholding the law while the army 
are in charge of defending the state's sovereignty. But 
things have been very different in Indonesia. In 1964, dur-
ing the Sukarno era, POLRJ was incorporated into the 
armed forces by Presidential Instruction KepPres No.290, 
1964 but it was under Suharto that steps were 
taken to militarise the Police by means of the 
National Defence Law of 1982 and the Police 
Law of 1997. 
Although POLRI has been separated from 
ABRI, it remains under the jurisdiction of the 
Defence Minister, General Wiranto, who contin-
ues to be the commander-in-chief of ABRI, a 
fact which casts doubt over the true significance 
of the change. Since the change, the army has 
begun to use its former name, Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia or TNI; the term is increasingly being 
used instead of ABRI which also includes the 
navy and the air force. 
POLRI structurally part of ABRI 
As part of ABRI, the Police Force has taken 
on all facets of army structure, including ranks, 
budget, duties and even wage structure. The 
1997 Law placed POLRI within the integral 
command structure of ABRI. 
maybe not quite as brutal as its foster parent 1Jut the differ-
ence is marginal. 
In the early years of Suharto's Orde Baru, the police 
force had practically no function. The army was in charge 
of law and order in general and its powerful security body 
Kopkamtib had virtually unlimited powers to arrest and 
detain people. Under Indonesia's procedural code, the po-
lice force is the arresting agency also responsible for inter-
rogating suspects, but in many instances, especially in po-
litical cases, it was the army that arrested and held people. 
This has created huge problems for the aver-
age policeman on the beat. Most organised crime 
The much hated Anti-Riot Police 
such as gambling, smuggling, prostitution is connected to 
members of the army, meaning that the police are power-
less to arrest the culprits. 
The police academy has a military curriculum which 
does not recognise the force as the guardian of the general 
public but is based on the military credo of treating every-
body as a suspect. 
Expenditure on the police has been ridiculously low be-
cause most of ABRI's budget has gone to the army, the 
superstar. The general public has always had a low opin-
ion of the understaffed, poorly-trained police. Police have a 
track record of violence and many people have died in po-
lice custody. Police officers have also been involved in 
numerous killings of criminal suspects on the streets, with 
no attempt to charge the perpetrators. Corruption is ram-
pant and the average policeman lacks authority. The force 
is justifiably regarded as the illegitimate child of ABRI, 
It was not untii the early nineties when popular protest be-
came more frequent, that POLRI's role became more up 
front. 
POLRI against demonstrators 
Domestic and international criticism of the excessive 
role of ABRI in curbing internal dissent forced Suharto and 
the ABRI leadership to adopt a new policy. By 1993 the 
police were beginning to deal with popular unrest. 
It was now the role of POLRI to arrest and interrogate 
suspects, while a special POLRI force was responsible for 
dealing with demonstrators on the streets. This new policy 
was first tried out in so-called 'troublespots' like East 
Timar. This resulted in a change in Dili, the capital of East 
Timar, when police officers began to arrest demonstrators 
who were taken to the police station instead of the military 
command posts, although the army's special force, Kopas-
sus did not relinquish its special intelligence role. 
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POLRFs special force Brimob (Brigade Mobil, Mobile 
Brigade) became a much feared and hated force. This is the 
most militarised force in POLRI and is trained to deal with 
mass demonstrations. Brimob possesses sophisticated 
equipment, including UK-made water cannon and ar-
moured personal carriers. Since the May 1998 upheaval, 
some forces within POLRI have received special anti-riot 
training and have re-emerged as PHH (Pasukan Anti Huru-
Hara, Anti Riot Unit) . It has become a daily scene in urban 
centres to see PHH and Brimob units chasing and clubbing 
demonstrators. 
In places of violent unrest like Maluku and West Ka-
limantan [see separate item], police officers were given 
orders from their superiors in Jakarta to shoot on sight, and 
they have acted accordingly. 
Conflict at the top 
Senior police officers are frequently in conflict with 
their army counterparts. Seven years ago Police Major-
General Koesparmono Irsan, then head of the Police Acad-
emy, proposed that the police should be separated from 
ABRI. Most POLRI officers favour this, not least because 
POLRI is often called on to do the dirty work of the army, 
such as arresting students, with their officers having to take 
the blame; while the overall strategy and command is in the 
hands of the military. 
In particular the tragic shooting of students at the Tri-
sakti University in May 1998 upset the police force. A 
number of police officers were scapegoated and tried for 
the shooting while the army came out relatively unscathed. 
National Police Chief General Dibyo Widodo publicly 
protested at the way his officers had been sacrificed; not 
Jong afterwards he was replaced. The present police chief, 
General Roesmanhadi has continued to press for separa-
tion. Finally on 1 April the first grudging step was taken. 
The next steps 
The most difficult part is how to demilitarise the police 
force. A whole generation of police officers have been 
trained to think like the military. Before the average police 
officer can be seen as protector of the general public in 
poor urban neighbourhoods, there will have to be a com-
plete overhaul in mentality and training. The curriculum at 
the Police Academy will also need to be changed. 
continued from page 20 
forces have busied themselves primarily with evacuating 
terrified refugees instead of hunting down and arresting the 
perpetrators. 
Suharto's Orde Baru created a culture of violence. As 
Professor Ben Anderson from Cornell University said 
during a recent visit to Indonesia, it started with the killings 
of hundreds of thousands of innocent people in 1965/1966. 
ABRI's tradition of fostering criminal and para-military 
groups to do its dirty work has contributed to this tradition 
of resolving problems with machetes and guns. 
Disastrous government policies like the ambitious 
transmigration programme have significantly contributed to 
disrupting fragile, complex social structures in many re-
gions outside Java, as pointed out by indigenous leaders at 
their Congress in March (see separate item). 
Another key problem is the territorial structure of the 
army. Territorial military commands function as shadow 
administrations down to the village level. If POLRI is to 
act as the upholder of law, the army's territorial structure 
should be abolished. This is what ending the army's dwi-
fungsi should ,really mean. But this territorial structure is 
the backbone of the army's stranglehold over society 
which means that a lot of political will is needed and many 
battles will be need to be fought before the army is willing 
to relinquish this power structure. 
An essential part of the civilianisation of the police is its 
location in the government structure under a civilian min-
istry. In most countries, the police are under the interior 
ministry but in Indonesia, this ministry is also controlled by 
the army. 
Anti-subversion law repeal changes little 
The widely-condemned anti-subversion law is now in 
the process of being repealed, but it will be replaced by six 
new articles in the Criminal Code to deal with anti-state 
'crimes'. Justifying the change, the Justice Minister, Mu-
ladi, said this was to prevent a 'legal vacuum'. In other 
words, there is no intention to relinquish state powers to 
convict and punish people for political activities. 
The new articles will penalise activities endangering the 
Pancasila, propagating Marxism-Leninism, acts of sabo-
tage and attacks on military installations. The maximum 
penalty under these articles will be twenty years instead of 
death as under the anti-subversion Jaw. These anti-state 
'crimes' will now be regulated under the criminal proce-
dural code, which allows detention without charge of up to 
sixty days, instead of the one year period under the anti-
subversion law. 
In addition, a new law on state security is being drafted 
by the armed forces commander General Wiranto and will 
be submitted to Parliament for adoption before the June 
elections. According to Muladi, the new law will allow the 
armed forces to take measures to cope with unrest. [Jakarta 
Post, 1 April] 
Leading human rights lawyer, Munir, who has seen the 
draft of the bill says it is modelled on Malaysia's Internal 
Security Act and will be even more of a threat to the public 
than the discredited anti-subversion law. Warning people 
not to underestimate ABRI, Munir said that if the new law 
is enacted, it will empower the authorities to 'to silence or 
arrest anyone regarded as a threat to (their) vested inter-
ests'. [Jakarta Post, 6 April] * 
It is undoubtedly true that dark forces are deliberately 
trying to destabilise the country, in particular in the run-up 
to the general elections which, as everyone agrees, is a 
critical fir~t step towards building democratic political 
s~ructures m the ~ost-Suharto era. The bombing of the Is-
~1qlal Mosque which was clearly designed to trigger feud-
~ng betwe~n rv:tuslims and Christians, the fanning of relig-
ious conflicts tn Maluku and the killings in West Java are 
clear examples of conflicts triggered by gangsters in the 
pay of forces linked to Suharto's New Order. 
So far, the security forces have shown themselves to be 
powerless, inca~able even of making meaningful arrests, 
let alone producmg any answers to why violence is now so 
widespread. In truth, they are part of the problem though it 
has not yet been possible to substantiate the many suspi-
cions that members of ABRI are the ones who are causing 
~~~- . 
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Growing conflicts within ABRI 
Recent events in East Timor, West Kalimantan and Maluku ·expose deep-rooted differences within 
the Indonesian armed forces, ABRI, botk at the top and in the field. Indonesian contemporary his-
tory is marked by violent internal conflicts resulting in misery for the 1ndonesian people. The post-
Suharto period contains all the ingredients of yet another eruption within ABRI. 
The wide-ranging reshuffle in ABRI earlier this year 
[see TAPOL Bulletin No. 151 , March 1999] was a sign of 
serious splits within ABRI but the internal conflicts are far 
from over. According to leaked reports · in March, a ·second 
reshuffle was about to be announced but nothing happened, 
which suggests that there is a stalemate in Cilangkap, 
ABRI's Pentagon · and in Bina Graha, the presidential of-
fice. Formally, President Habibie has the final say as Pan-
glima Tertinggi, the Supreme Commander. In this new re-
shuffle, already widely leaked and reported in the press, the 
Army Chief of Staff General Subagyo is slated to lose his 
ob. The head of EAKIN, the co-ordinating body for intelli-
gence, Lt. . General Z.A. Maulani would also be replaced. 
The documents for the reshuffle have reportedly been 
ready for some. time and are now on the desk of the Presi-
dent awaiting his signature. 
Reform or status quo 
It could be argued that General Wiranto who holds two 
key positions, as minister for defence and security and 
ABRI commander-in-chief, enjoys the luxury of wielding 
great power. Not for a very long time has anyone held both 
these posts. 
But in reality the four-star general is in a very weak po-
sition. ABRI's image in the eyes of the Indonesian public 
has never been so low. The involvement of officers in the 
killing and kidnapping of activists, ABRl's vicious role in 
Aceh, East Timor and other places has been widely re-
ported in the post-Suharto era. General Wiranto's alliance 
with President Habibie is regarded by many as being very 
shaky. Almost daily, people demonstrate in the streets de-
manding the resignation of both men. 
The Habibie government has so far failed to delivere 
anything substantial: the economy is still in shambles and 
political stability remains out of reach. The transitional 
government is trapped in between reform and status quo. 
The public judge the government lacking credibility and 
legality. Most ABRI officers regard any reform as being an 
effort to minimise their political power. Students in the 
streets continue to demand reform and an end to the dual 
function of ABRI while ABRI officers are increasingly 
involved in schemes to destabilise the country and derail 
the process of reform. 
ABRI conflict at the top 
General Wiranto and his group of reform officers still 
support the process of reform of the Habibie government, 
as far as it goes. Two of the most important events; the 
special MPR session in November and the general elec-
tions in June 1999 are top of the agenda. At the same time 
this reform group in ABRI continue to re-define and re-
shape ABRI so as to turn it into something distinct from its 
structure during the Orde Baru. 
In a seminar held in London on 29 and 30 March by 
two think-tanks, the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
and the Portuguese IEEI, Air Vice-Marshall Graito Usodo, 
advisor to General Wiranto, presented a 14-point pro-
gramme of reform. He said that ABRI would continue with 
internal reform and the changes would be significant and 
drastic. 
The more important points were: ABRI is redefining its 
role for the next century and will reshape its role in con-
formity with political changes in society. This includes 
separation of the police force from ABRI [see separate 
item] and an overhaul of ABRI's sospol tasks which man-
age the implementation of ABRI's dual role in society, in 
other words, ABRI's meddling in civilian affairs. 
Air Vice-Marshall Graito Usodo also spoke about 
changes in the territorial duties of ABRI by redefining se-
curity and order at the village level. The reformed ABRI 
will no longer be involved in day-to-day politics and ABRI 
seats in the legislative bodies DPR/MPR will eventually be 
reduced. ABRI will not favour any political party, includ-
ing Golkar, the ruling party. ABRI will also redefine its 
doctrines. While it is obvious that ABRI reformers are try-
ing to develop a new format for ABRI, the big question 
remains: does the average ABRI officer agree with all the 
changes? 
While at the conceptual level, ABRI seems to be pur-
suing a course of reform, the reality is that there are cracks 
all over the place~ Lt. General Hendropriyono, presently 
Minister of Transmigration is known to aspire to the posi-
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tion of Wiranto . A notoriously brutal and ambitious man, 
Hendropriyono was given the choice by Wiranto of con-
tinuing as a cabinet minister and retiring from ABRI or 
resigning from the cabinet and returning to ABRI without a 
position. Hendropriyono soon realised that his bid for 
power was over and opted to remain in the cabinet. 
Army chief of staff General Subagyo turned out to be 
more difficult to handle. As former commander of the 
6,000-strong elite Kopassus squad, Subagyo represents an 
important segment of ABRI. His conflict with Wiranto is a 
public secret but Wiranto has no,t been ~ble ~o m~ster t~e 
strength to remove him. Subagyo s conflict with W1ranto 1s 
not only a power struggle but involves competitio~ re-
garding arms procurement. Everybody knows that business 
deals with the arms industry in the west means juicy deals 
involving the transfer of large , sums of money to private 
bank accounts in Switzerland. It was widely reported in the 
Indonesian press that Subagyo was due to become the next 
ambassador in Malaysia. 
Another conflict is between the present ABRI leader-
ship and retired ABRI officers. While the Wiranto group 
has more or less resigned itself to playing a lesser role in 
society, many veterans see this as a betrayal of ABRI's 
achievements. Within the cabinet, Wiranto often has to 
deal with General Feisal Tandjung who holds the post of 
coordinating minister for politics and security. Feisal 
Tandjung is typical of a Orde Baru officer and not likely to 
abandon the idea that ABRI should be in the driver's seat. 
He represents the feelings of many retired officers and 
poses a threat to the Wiranto group. 
Conflicts in the field 
While conflicts at the top remain unresolved, conflicts 
at lower levels are reaching danger-point. East Timar is a 
clear example of territorial commanders openly organising 
and conducting military operations by using para-military 
groups to attack villages in stark contravention of the pol-
icy of Habibie, their supreme commander. 
Major-General Adam Damiri, the commander of the 
Udayana military command, publicly held a meeting with 
para-militaries, at which he gave the signal for Operasi 
Sapu Jagad to start, resulting in many casualties among the 
population in many parts of East Timor, including the 
capital Dili. With this act Damiri is in open defiance of 
Habibie's decision to give the East Timorese the chance to 
determine their own political future. Some local Indonesian 
sub-district commanders are openly recruiting and organ-
ising the para-militaries. Should they fail to get enough 
recruits, territorial soldiers must disguise themselves as 
para-militaries. The cost of this operation is enormous and 
analysts in Jakarta believe that the money is being supplied 
by a group of influential retired generals including Benny 
Murdani and Try Sutrisno. Most highly-placed officers in 
the eighties owed their senior positions in ABRI to their 
long terms of service in East Timor. 
The role of the military intelligence 
The eruption of unrest throughout Indonesia is one of 
the most hotly discussed topics in political circles. All the 
events of the past few months cannot but lead to the con-
clusion that the performance of both BIA, the military in-
telligence, and Bakin, the intelligence coordinating body, is 
woeful None of the major clashes in Ainbon and ~est Kalim~ntan [see separate item] were foreseen by ei~her 
agency. During the January reshuffle, BIA chief ~v1aJOr­
General Zacky Anwar Makarim got the sack but his su.c-
cessor Major General Tyasno Sudarto has not made a dif-
ference. Formally speaking, Bakin is a civilian agenc~ b~t 
it is always run by ABRI officers. Officially it is ?ot w1t~m 
the ABRI structure and reports only to the president, hke 
the national security council in Washin~t~n . The present 
Bakin chief, Major-General Z.A . Maulam .1s ~ery close to 
Habibie. Since recently taking over, he d1sm1ssed all the 
senior officials, all of them senior ABRI officers. 
At a more fundamental level, political analysts believe 
that it is not so much a question of the intelligence bodies 
performing woefully but that they are the ~ource ?f the un-
rest. The theory that it is provocation that 1s ~ausmg all th.e 
unrest is still seen as the most likely explanation although it 
could be argued that this theory downplays the reality of 
antagonisms between rival groups in Ambon and We.st 
Kalimantan. Major General Zacky Anwar was present m 
Dili during the terrible events of 17 A~ril, allegedl.Y on a 
working visit. It seems obvious that W1ranto and his staff 
are not in control of the intelligence apparatus. In none of 
the major events of unrest have any of th~ perpetrators 
been arrested. Increasingly, the general pubhc belteve that 
the unrest has been triggered by certain forces to destabi-
lise the political situation and render general elections vir-
tually impossible. 
The history of ABRI conflicts 
The history of independent Indonesia is ridden with in-
ternal ABRI conflicts. The Madiun affair in 1948, usually 
described as a communist rebellion, was in fact an internal 
conflict within ABRI in which left-wing units were de-
feated by right-wing units. 
During the fifties, Indonesia's fragile democracy was 
trying hard to run the state along democratic lines while 
ABRI was straining to get out of the barracks and play a 
role in politics. Several efforts were made to topple the 
government, the most serious being in October I 952 when 
senior army officers, backed by troops and tanks, tried to 
overthrow the Sukarno government. The regional rebel-
lions in 1958 when parts of Sumatra and the northern part 
of Sulawesi tried to break away from Jakarta were also an 
internal ABRJ affair as the rebel leaders were virtually all 
military men. 
The October 1965 event when six senior generals were 
killed by a faction within ABRI was also an internal ABRI 
conflict although the official version still blames the PKI, 
the Communist Party, for trying for trying to seize power. 
In all these conflicts, the people were the ones who suf-
fered the consequences. Hundreds of thousands of people 
lost their lives and millions were incarcerated as a result of 
the 1965 events 
The present conflict within ABRI is very dangerous. 
The killing of innocent villagers in East Timor is an act 
of insubordination by ABRI officers. Conflicts within 
ABRI will continue to pose a threat because of ABRI's 
dominant role in Indonesia's politics. Unless the mili-
tary doctrine dwifungsi is abolished once and for all, and 
ABRI is limited to protecting Indonesia's territorial 
sovereignty, human tragedies will continue to jeopardise 
the security and safety of the 210 million inhabitants of 
the archipelago. * 
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Stalemate follows dialogue with Habibie 
After months of procrastination, the National Dialogue between President Habibie and representa-
tives of the people of West Papua was held on 26 February. Responding to the demand for independ-
ence, the president had nothing to offer apart from advising his visitors to 'reflect'. In April, the po-
lice in lrian Jaya in a direct attack on freedom of speech, prohibited all activities to socialise the 
dialogue, arousing widespread anger throughout the province. 
The initiative to hold a dialogue between the people 
of West Papua and the Indonesian president came in the 
wake of a number of flag-raising incidents last July, 
some of which were brutally quelled by the armed 
forces. The National Dialogue was seen as a way of 
calming down passions in favour of independence which 
followed the collapse of Suharto's New Order last May. 
It was hoped that dialogue would pave the way for ne-
gotiations rather than confrontation during which yet 
more people would fall victim. 
For almost a year, West Papuans have been voicing 
their many grievances against Jakarta because of the 
constant pattern of atrocities to which they have been 
subject for over three decades, the unbridled exploitation 
of the territory's abundant natural resources, and the sei-
zure of ancestral lands bringing impoverishment for the 
people. 
Independence, the only way 
A delegation of one hundred representatives from all 
parts of West Papua attended the National Dialogue with 
President Habibie which was held at the Presidential Pal-
ace on 26 February. The event was well reported in the 
Indonesian media, giving the Indonesian public some idea 
of the depth of resentment felt towards Jakarta from one of 
its far-flung dominions. 
Leading the delegation was Tom Beanal, head of the 
Amungme tribal council, LEMASA, based in Timika. 
Beanal is widely known for his courageous challenge to 
Freeport/Rio Tinto, the multinational which has for years 
trampled on his people's rights and despoiled their ances-
tral lands. In presenting a statement on behalf of the dele-
gation, he made it clear that the overwhelming majority of 
West Papuans support independence. He said they would 
wait till the end of March for the President's reply. If this 
did not come or the reply was unsatisfactory, they would 
press for international talks between the Indonesian gov-
ernment, the United Nations and the people of West Papua, 
and would take measures to set up a transitional govern-
ment. He said later that they would also call on the popula-
tion to boycott the general elections scheduled for 7 June. 
'During 36 years of integration with Indonesia,' he said, 
'we have been treated with contempt. We will not consider 
anything but independence.' 
He said that the delegation included representatives 
from all the fifteen districts in the province of Irian Jaya 
Habibie and some members of the National Dialogue 
and they had come with clear mandates from their people. 
In Timika, 13,755 questionnaires had been sent out, of 
which 13, 7 53 had been returned in favour of independence, 
with only two against. In Fak-Fak, a consultation had been 
held during which all the 16,281 respondents had sup-
ported independence. 
The Dialogue initiative provided a platform for West 
Papuans to air their aspirations and was well reported 
elsewhere, particularly in the Netherlands. In Washington, 
six members of the US Congress from both parties wrote 
to President Habibie describing the Dialogue as 'the most 
constructive means of resolving the long-standing and on-
going human rights problems within Irian Jaya'. The Dia-
logue would, they said, 'require openness to international 
scrutiny of the process, including access to the United Na-
tions and other international observers and timely media 
coverage.' The members of Congress also said: 'It would 
be extremely unfortunate if this attempt at National Dia-
logue were to suffer the defects that detract from its legiti-
macy, such as the problems of inadequate representation 
and human rights violations that marred the 1969 Act of 
Free Choice.' They called on President Habibie to release 
people detained for participating in flag-raising and other 
peaceful expressions of their aspirations for freedom and 
urged him to allow international observers and humanitar-
ian relief organisations full access to Irian Jaya. 
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Habibie in agreeing to take part in a high profile meet-
ing with West Papuans, seemed to be anxious to project a 
willingness to listen although he had nothing concrete to 
say that would satisfy the West Papuans. Whatever his in-
tentions however, he clearly did not have the support of the 
armed forces as was clear from the experiences of the 
members of the Team of One Hundred on their return 
home. Several of them were subjected to acts of intimida-
tion. Rocks were thrown at their homes and their vehicles 
and cars were damaged by unidentified groups but when 
appeals were made to the security forces for protection, 
they were told that no protection could be provided. 
Confronted with the real danger of physical attacks on 
members of the dialogue delegation, a decision was taken 
to set up 'posts' called posko for the protection of the dele-
gates. 
Freedom to socialise Dialogue banned 
For the members of the Team of One Hundred, the 
next step was to inform their communities about the Dia-
logue with Indonesia's head of state. 
However, on 17 April, the regional chief of police, 
Brigadier-General Hotman Siagian, issued a Police Proc-
lamation banning all activities to socialise the results of the 
dialogue with the president and ordering the closure of the 
posts and support networks within seventy-two hours. 
These activities were described as being 'separatist' and a 
source of disorder in the community. John Rumbiak, well-
known human rights advocate, condemned this as a blatant 
violation of freedom of expression. 
The Proclamation alleged that socialisation of the Dia-
logue, the poskos and other organisations set up by the 
Team of One Hundred had 'caused anxieties, splits and 
fear within the community which if unchecked could dis-
rupt stability and security'. The ban cited Article 154 of 
the Criminal Code setting penalties for 'expressions of ha-
tred of the government authorities' and Law 9/1998 on 
Freedom of Expression as the grounds for possible action 
against those who ignore the ban. 
Theo Uluay, head of the Irian Jaya Tribal Council, 
made a direct appeal to the police chief to lift this unjust 
ban and warned that there could be trouble throughout the 
province if this was not done within a week. A group of 
members of the Team of One Hundred also made repre-
sentations to the police chief along similar lines. 
Freeport gets go-ahead for expansion 
The giant copper-and-gold mine operated by US-bas~d 
Freeport with massive investments from London~based RIO 
Tinto has won government approval for a doubling of out-
put, from 160,000 tons per day to 300,000 .t~d. [Jakarta 
Post, I April] This will hugely increase the tailings spewed 
out, to the detriment of the local people whose ancestral 
land was seized more than twenty years ago. Needless to 
say, the tribal people who have suffered so much as a ~e~ult 
of the mine's operations were not consulted about giving 
approval for this expansion. 
Freeport's application for this expansion was initially 
given the go-ahead by Habibie, which led the Minister of 
Mines and Energy to protest that this should not be done 
without an increase in royalties paid to the government. 
After lengthy negotiations, the Ministry secured an agree-
ment for royalties to be increased from 1.5 per cent to 3.5 
per cent on copper sales, and 1 per cent on gold and silver 
sales. A Ministry official said the company had agreed to 
four conditions: increasing royalties payable to the gov-
ernment, improving tailing management, stepping up envi-
ronmental protection and improving slope stability. 
There is no indication that an Environmental Impact 
Assessment was conducted in advance of this expansion, 
which only proves how easy it is for multinational corpo-
rations to get their way with the present government. A 
hastily convened meeting was held by the Mines Ministry 
to which Tom Beanal, who chairs the Amungme Tribal 
Council, Fr Theo v.d. Broek and the district chief of 
Timika were invited, but discussions were brief with virtu-
ally no chance of challenging, let alone delaying, the ap-
proval until local people had been consulted. * 
continued from page 6 
and on the same day, 5 April, he issued a statement telling 
his people to take action against the terror campaign in 
self-defence. 
From all sides in the Indonesian government and the 
para-militaries, Xanana was denounced for allegedly issu-
ing a 'declaration of war'. General Feisal Tanjung, the Co-
ordinating Minister for Politics and Security Affairs, 
threatened to send Xanana to the notorious Nusakamban-
gan prison island while Justice Minister Muladi warned 
that if he failed to retract the statement within a week, he 
would be returned to Cipinang prison. The para-
military/ ABRI forces blamed Xanana's statement for 
making them step up their actions. The bloodbath in 
Liquisa came on the day after but as Xanana said in his 
statement, the prologue to the Liquisa bloodbath had al-
ready taken four lives. 
Western governments refused to be dragged into blam-
ing Xanana. Their criticisms after Liquisa and later after 
the 17 April terror in Dili have put the blame squarely on 
ABRI and their para-military proxies. Xanana has not been 
moved anywhere and Muladi's threats are now part of his-
tory. * 
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1965 tapols released at last 
Ten political prisoners, all of whom have been in prison for more than thirty years, were finally re-
leased from prison in March. There are now no more tapols being in connection with the events of 
1965. Their release led to renewed interest in the events of October 1965 and to Suharto's role in the 
killing of the generals and the massacre of hundreds of thousands of communist suspects. Some 
former PK/ members are conducting investigations of the massacres in several parts of Java. 
The first four to be released on 25 March were being 
held in Cipinang Prison Jakarta. They were: Asep Surya-
man (73), who had been in detention since September 
1971, and First Sergeant Bungkus (71), Sergeant Major 
Nataneal Marsudi (71) and Colonel Abdul Latief (72) all 
of whom had been in prison since October 1965. The first 
three had been under sentence of death while Colonel 
Latief had been serving a life sentence. 
The other six were being held in other parts of the 
country and were released within the following days. They 
were: Isnanto (74), under sentence of death, who was in 
Tanjung Gusta Prison, Medan; Markus Giroth and Sido, 
both serving life in Ujung Pandang Prison; Buyung Ketek, 
and Sri Suhardjo, who were being held in Padang, and 
Soma Surabrata who was being held in Pamekasan 
Prison, Madura. They were all serving life sentences. 
One shameless indignity to which they were subjected 
was the requirement to sign statements of fidelity to the 
state dogma, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution. Law-
yers acting for the four men in Cipinang said that had re-
fused to sign but were compelled to do so, otherwise they 
would have had to remain behind bars. 
Re-writing history 
The releases unleashed a huge in-
terest among journalists and histori-
ans, eager to hear what they had to say 
about the events of October 1965. 
With Suharto removed from power, 
here was a golden opportunity to 
check the official version that could 
not be challenged while Suharto was 
in charge. 
The four men from Cipinang 
Prison issued a joint statement when 
they left prison in which they said that 
they intended to help re-write history 
by clarifying the events on the night of 
30 September. They said quite cate-
gorically that the man who staged the 
coup d'etat against Sukarno was Su-
harto. His hold on power for thirty-
two years had come about because of 
his own manipulations, they said. 
[Merdeka, 27 March] 
Among the first to want to hear their accounts were the 
children of some of the generals who were kidnapped and 
murdered on the night of 30 September. From their com-
ments, it is clear that they are not satisfied with Suharto's 
version, which is understandable since it is now well 
known that Suharto was informed by Colonel Latief of the 
impending kidnaps several hours beforehand. Their fathers 
might have been alive now had he acted on that warning. 
Riyanto Nurhadi, the 42-year-old son of the late Major-
General Harjono said he hoped the freed prisoners would 
'begin the process of revising history'. 'I have a feeling 
that they will tell us the true version of the 1965 abortive 
coup,' said Riyadi, who was nine years old at the time of 
his father's death. 'My mother and our whole family do not 
bear any grudges against them. We only hope they wHI not 
keep silent after all these years.' 
The daughter of the murdered General Pandjaitan, Tuti 
Pandjaitan, who was eleven years old in 1965, said 
' History has been engineered to serve the interests of the 
New Order regime. The PK! and the Air Force were made 
the scapegoats.-' She too hoped the released men would 
reveal the truth about 1965. 
The Cipinang Four celebrating their release 
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But the daughter of another slain general was more 
cautious. Nani Nurahman, daughter of the late General So-
etojo, only warned people against exploiting the releases, 
saying it 'would open old wounds both for former political 
prisoners and the relatives of the slain generals.' [Jakarta 
Post, 29 March] 
An internal army affair, says Bungkus 
Within days of his release, Sergeant Bungkus was tell-
ing the press that the 30 September Movement was an in-
ternal affair of the army and was not a movement run by 
the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI. This contradicts 
Suharto's claim, which became the official version, that the 
PKI was behind the action, on the basis of which he 
branded the action with the name 'G30SIPKI' and immedi-
ately proceeded to physically annihilate the PKI. 
Former Sergeant Bungkus, who was a member of the 
Cakrabirawa Palace Guard at the time of the kidnapping of 
the generals, has been interviewed by several publications 
and newspapers since his release. The Palace Guard was 
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, one of 
three army officers who led the action against the generals 
on the night of 30 September 1965. He was tried soon after 
Suharto took power and executed. Another member of the 
trio, Brigadier-General Supardjo, was also executed. The 
third member was Colonel Latief who was given a life 
sentence and was released from Cipinang Prison together 
with Bungkus. 
In an interview with Suara Karya, Bungkus explained 
that he was in command of the unit that was ordered to 
capture Major-General Haryono. He was captured at his 
home but was shot dead soon afterwards by a member of 
his team even though they had been under instructions to 
take him alive. (The original purpose of the kidnappings 
was to force the generals who were thought to be plotting 
against President Sukarno to appear before Sukarno and 
account for their actions.) Bungkus said that the soldier 
who shot him had been startled by a shadow looming and 
fired his rifle, killing the general. 
He strongly denied that he was a member of the PKI; he 
was simply a soldier acting on orders from his superior 
officer. He said that he had no regrets because he acted 
strictly according to military discipline, carrying out the 
orders of his superior officer. 
He said he was firmly convinced that the 30 September 
Movement (led by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung) was an 
internal affair of the army reflecting dissatisfaction among 
some officers with the policies of their superiors. 
Had the Movement really been run by the PKI, Jakarta 
would have gone up in flames, he said, and other parts of 
the country would have been thrown into chaos. 
Bungkus returned home to impoverished circumstances; 
he has never owned a house or even a tiny plot of land. 
During the 34 years he spent behind bars, his wife and 
their six children went through extremely hard times. 
'They suffered much more than I did because in prison I 
always had something to eat but they were often thrown 
onto the streets.' [Suara Karya, 30 & 31 March] 
Ex-tapol: Indict Suharto for 1965 killings 
Former political prisoners who were arrested and held 
for many years following the 1965 events have called for 
Suharto to be indicted for crimes against humanity because 
of his role in organising the slaughter of hundreds of tho~­
sands of people in the six months after he took power m 
October 1965. 
The ex-tapols were speaking at a press co~fercnce a~ the 
Legal Aid Institute office in Jakarta to launcn ~he Institute 
for the Study of the 1965/1966 Massacres. Chairing the 
Institute is Sulami, until 1965 the secretary-general of 
GERWANI, the women's organisation banned by Suharto. 
'The massacres were perpetrated by Suharto and his mili-
tary henchmen. We will reveal the truth about the massacre 
of PKI members in order to make the public realise that 
such practices should never have been regarded as appro-
priate,' she said. [Indonesian Observer, 16 April] 
The decision to make the investigations public was an 
act of great courage at a time when expressing sympathy 
for Suharto's millions of PKI victims is still regarded as 
taboo though eagerness to know the truth about 1965 and 
Suharto's role is growing .. By doing so, the organisers 
clearly hope to challenge public opinion to face the crimi-
nal role of the country's dictator who ruled the country for 
more than 32 years. GERWANI in particular suffered 
grievously because Suharto sought to demonise the 
women's organisation by spreading malicious lies about its 
role in the murder of the six generals. 
Sulami told the press that investigations already con-
ducted in many parts of Central Java had shown that in 
Blora alone, 8,000 people had been slain. 'The mass grave 
(in Blora) is located in Cagak Blora forest. We haven't yet 
dug up the whole grave but having gone only one metre 
down, we already found human bones,' she said. She iden-
tified other places where mass graves had been discovered. 
Asked why she was so sure that Suharto was responsi-
ble, considering that civilians had also taken part in the 
killings, Sulami said Suharto led the military operation at 
the time. 'The fact that civilians took part_ in some regions 
was the result of military intervention. Before the army 
arrived in the villages, no such brutalities occurred.' She 
also spoke of her own experiences during 19 years of im-
prisonment from 1967 till 1986. [Merdeka, 16 April] 
Also present at the press conference were representa-
tives of other mass organisations banned by Suharto, Pe-
muda Rakjat (People's Youth) and LEKRA, the organisa-
tion of cultural workers, as well as the banned PKI daily, 
Harian Rakjat. Indonesia's leading writer, Pramoedya An-
anta Toer, who spent 14 years in prison after 1965 is on the 
advisory board of the Institute. He was not present at the 
launch as he was in North America on a speaking tour to 
launch his prison memoir, A Mute 's Soliloquy. 
Gulag memoir re-published in Indonesia 
The prison memoir by Carmel Budiardjo, Surviving In-
donesia's Gulag, has been re-published in its Indonesian 
translation in Indonesia and is now on sale in bookshops. 
The Indonesian title is Bertahan Hidup di Gulag Indonesia. 
The first edition which came out in 1997 was not sold in 
bookshops but was distributed through the grapevine .. 
1965 bibliography by TAPOL 
A four-page bibliography listing all major books and 
articles about 1965 has been prepared by T APOL and is 
available on our website. Copies can also be obtained from 
our office, for a small donation to cover costs. * 
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Killings in many parts of Indonesia 
The post-Suharto era has been marked by unspeakable ethnic and religious violence. The bombing 
of the Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta's main mosque, indicates that dark forces are trying to destabilise the 
country. The killings in West Kalimantan, South-East Maluku and West Java during March and 
April has caused many to doubt whether the general elections can take place in these regions. 
Ethnic cleansing of Madurese 
Violence erupted in West Kalimantan between 
local Malays and Dayaks and the Madurese minor-
ity. The conflict was located in the Sambas district, 
near the border with Malaysia. By late March, In-
donesian press reports said that at least 33,000 
Madurese refugees were sheltering in the capital, 
Pontianak. The district of Sambas has a population 
of around 800,000 people, of whom eight per cent 
are Madurese. Official sources say that two hundred 
people have been killed in the carnage but observers 
believe that the death toll is far higher. Many 
Madurese settlers were forced to flee into the jungle 
where the chances of survival are slight. 
Madurese have been moving to Kalimantan 
since the sixties and they are now into the third gen-
eration. These are people who were born in Ka-
limantan and have never lived on their island of ori-
gin, Madura. 
The international press has reported extensively 
on this latest conflict, not least because of the grotesque 
brutality of the killings. The conflict has been bitter and 
merciless and the security forces were unable to do any-
thing. Whole Madurese settlements were slaughtered. 
Along the road from Singkawang to Montrado which is a 
Madurese settlement, severed heads were on display. Some 
of the killings were ritual. In the second week of the con-
flict, the security forces were given orders to shoot on 
sight, as a result of which several people were shot dead. 
On-going conflict 
The conflict between the Dayaks and Malays, the two 
local communities, and the Madurese, the newcomers, has 
been going on for several years. In late 1996 and early 
1997, there was a new eruption which became extremely 
violent. On that occasion, it was between the Dayaks and 
the Madurese [see also TAPOL Bulletin No. 139, February 
1997]. But tension between the ethnic groups goes back to 
1968 when the first forest concessions were granted and 
Madurese transmigrants started to arrive. 
In many parts of the Indonesian archipelago, there are 
simmering conflicts between locals and newcomers. Ac-
cording to one explanation, problems emerge because of 
deep-rooted differences between local people steeped in 
their communal lifestyle and newcomers who bring a mer-
cantile lifestyle with them. These problems are universal. 
The Orde Baru economic system has only deepened the 
Citizens of Ambon seeking refuge to other islands 
rift between the two entities, fostering business opportuni-
ties for the mercantile class while the communal people are 
marginalised, sinking deeper and deeper into misery and 
impoverishment. The Dayaks are rurals and the Malays 
live in the coastal and urban areas. Often the ethnic dis-
tinctions are not clear because of inter-mingling and inter-
marriage over several generations. Central government 
policies have only exacerbated the problems. 
Strictly speaking, it is not correct to identify the 
Madurese in Kalimantan as the mercantile class because 
most commercial activities are in the hands of Chinese or 
Sumatran traders. Some Madurese have emerged as small 
traders in the cities but their role in the economy is mar-
ginal. The locals accuse the Madurese of being aggressive 
and violent. Madurese are often portrayed as being quick-
tempered but the fact that many of them live in isolation in 
transmigration sites has resulted in a lack of communica-
tion and social intercourse with the local communities. 
Military way of resolving conflicts 
It was in 1979 that the first serious conflict erupted and 
it flared up again in 1983 and 1993. During the last conflict 
in 1996/1997, which lasted several months, at least three 
thousand Madurese were killed and tens of thousands were 
evacuated. The present outbreak is a virtual replay of 1997 
only worse, because most Madurese settlements have been 
razed to the ground and a large number of Madurese set-
tlers are now refugees. 
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The conflict between the communities was never prop-
erly resolved. The military authorities simply brought some 
elders together for a peace ritual which has obviously 
fai led. A monument to commemorate a peace treaty signed 
after the 1979 conflict was destroyed during the 1997 con-
fl ict. Such peace rituals do nothing to tackle the social and 
economic problems dividing the communities. Human 
rights groups also complain that none of the people guilty 
of the killings and other human rights abuses have been 
brought to trial. 
The fate of the Madurese 
The severity of this latest conflict will have serious re-
percussions for the Madurese community. In the short 
term, it is impossible for them to go back to their burned-
out villages. Nor is the option of returning to the over-
crowded island of Madura feasible. The only idea that the 
government has come up with so far is a proposal to reset-
tle the Madurese on an island near Pontianak, the capital of 
West Kalimantan. 
Maluku: the violence spreads 
In our last issue, we reported on 
the ethnic conflict in Ambon, the larg-
est island in the Maluku archipelago. 
While the troubles there have calmed 
down somewhat, killings have since 
flared up in other parts of Maluku. 
The violence in Ambon has forced 
many people to flee their homes and 
39,000 refugees are now sheltering on 
Buton, a small island off the south 
coast of Sulawesi which is hardly able 
to cope with this huge influx. Another 
75,000 refugees, mostly from Ujung 
Pandang and Bugis, have also fled 
back to their places of origin. 
On 30 March violence erupted in 
Tuai, the capital of the Kei islands in 
south-east Maluku. In a five-day clash 
between the Christian and Muslim 
communities, at least fifty people 
were killed. The reason for the out-
break is unclear but some local residents claimed that graf-
fiti defaming Islam was the trigger. Residents blame the 
violence on instigators, the same ones who fanned the ear-
lier conflict in Ambon and Haruku where at least 300 lives 
were lost. 
The two communities, both armed with machetes and 
Molotov cocktails, attacked each other. Powerless to stop 
the carnage, the security forces resorted to the method they 
used in Ambon and started shooting at the feuding crowds. 
Many of the victims have died or been wounded by gun-
fire. During the first week, at least 18,000 people sought 
refuge in police stations and the local air and naval bases. 
Very soon the conflict spread to Kei Besar island where 
people from two villages attacked another village and 
burned down sixty houses. Three people were killed and 
dozens wounded. On 14 April, Antara reported that 112 
had died and twenty-six villages had been destroyed on 
three islands in south-east Maluku. 
. ' 
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On 23 April, another conflict, which lasted three days, 
erupted. Thousands of feuding Muslims and Christians 
fought a fierce battle, which started when several police-
men opened fire on the opposing groups, injuring at least 
ten people. At the end of the first day, press reports said 
that eleven people had died. The total number of deaths is 
still unclear but it could reach into the hundreds. 
While all this was going on, violence erupted on the 
historic spice island of Banda in Nusatenggara Timur, 
where seven people lost their lives on 21 April. Two 
churches, forty-seven buildings and a kindergarten were 
gutted. 
A week earlier, violence had erupted again in Central 
Maluku in the district of Amahai, where two people were 
killed and twenty-one houses were torched. 
Political killings in West Java 
A series of assassinations has so far resulted in more 
than a hundred deaths in Ciamis, West Java. According to 
Kontras, the Commission for Missing People and Victims 
of Violence, the murders have been committed by people 
who have received military training. There are strong indi-
cations that the hundreds of assassinations last year in 
Banyuwangi, East Java, are being replicated in Ciamis. The 
victims are similar: soothsayers, Muslim clerics and people 
):';;»!/: 
s 
Kompas 24March1999 
known tor their anti-Suharto views. 
The killings in Banyuwangi were never resolved by the 
~uthorities despite the many warnings from local organisa-
tions about the perpetrators. The people of Ciamis have 
been stricken by fear and prefer to remain silent. 
Why the spiralling violence? 
Social scientists and politicians have come forward with 
many explanations for the violence that has spiralled since 
the d.ownfal! of Suhru:o last ~1ay. Everybody agrees that 
the tight gnp on society durmg the Suharto period was 
bound to lead to explosions once the iron-fist stability im-
posed by ABRI under the dictator was lifted. Conflicts 
between communities have existed for ages below the sur-
face but they were never properly addressed. 
On the contrary, as some local leaders in Kalimantan 
h~ve said, instead of dealing with the real issues, commu-
nity leaders have been forced to shake hands in meaning-
less peace rituals. During the recent outbursts, the security 
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Global condemnation of ABRI 
There has been international condemnation of ABRJ's actions in Timor, acknowledging that the 
para-militaries are operating under instructions from the armed forces. While these death squads 
continue to run ri?t in East Tfmor, the tripartite talks at the UN have failed as yet to reach agree-
ment on the hand/mg of security arrangements when the ballot on East Timor takes place in August. 
In February, Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, 
visited Jakarta, and held a meeting with Xanana Gusmao, 
something which has become a must for all visiting gov-
ernment leaders going to Jakarta. Developments then 
seemed to be on track for a peaceful ballot in a few 
months' time, provided the para-militaries who had already 
been disrupting parts of the country were disarmed and 
disbanded. The Indonesian claim that the paras represented 
one side of a dispute between two so-called 'warring fac-
tions', the pro-integrationists and pro-independence forces, 
was still widely accepted. 
In March, the Australian television programme, Date-
line, broadcast a film about the para-militaries called A Li-
cence to Kill giving a devastating portrayal of their leaders' 
bellicosity and the intimidating methods used to recruit 
members. Copies of the film were circulating worldwide 
and were used to persuade governments of the need to 
press for these death squads to be disarmed. 
But it was not until the appalling massacres in Liquisa 
and Dili that it became abundantly clear that paras were 
proxies of ABRI, a fact that was clearly reflected in most 
international press reporting on the incidents. 
The Guardian in London editorialised: 'It is now abso-
lutely clear that elements within the Indonesian military are 
set on destroying the chance for a peaceful choice .. . . Thugs 
armed by the local military have cut a murderous path 
across the territory.' It accused the military of engaging in 
'a blatant attempt to subvert the rights of the East Timorese 
and the wishes of the international community.' [The 
Guardian, 21 April] 
The New York Times placed the blame clearly on the 
militias backed by the Indonesian Army. It wrote in an 
editorial that arrangement for a vote on autonomy 'could 
fall apart if Jakarta fails to stop the militias, which have 
acted with the blessing of local army and police command-
ers. Washington must warn Indonesia that international 
loans could be suspended unless it acts. [NYT, 23 April] 
EU takes a stand amid mounting anger 
In the first of three public statements about East Timor 
during April, the European Union said, responding to the 
Liquisa massacre: 'The EU deeply deplores the rise of 
violence in East Timor during recent months ... and urges 
the Indonesian authorities to immediately intervene and 
stop such actions by militia by disarming them.' It strongly 
urged the Indonesian authorities to hold accountable those 
responsible for such killings. 
In a statement issued on 20 April, the EU expressed 
deep concern that violence had escalated substantially 
since its earlier statement. It condemned the fact that the 
killings at the home of Manuel Carrascalao 'occurred 
within a short distance of the Indonesian military command 
and that those forces did not intervene in order to prevent 
or stop the incident.' 
Meanwhile in the Irish Parliament on 22 April, Foreign 
Minister David Andrews delivered a statement on his visit 
to East Timor, saying: 'I was shocked and horrified by 
what I encountered there.' He said he had been 'appalled' 
by his meeting with the Indonesian-appointed governor and 
said of his meeting with the military commander, Colonel 
Tono Suratman that 'he did not demonstrate any willing-
ness or sense of responsibility ... to maintain law and order 
and to protect the lives and property of citizens'. This con-
firms the widely-held view that the Indonesian military 
doesn't give a toss about what the international community 
thinks. 
Soon after the Liquisa massacre, the Clinton Admini-
stration sent Stanley Roth. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Asia and the Pacific, to Jakarta to impress upon the Indo-
nesian authorities its condemnation of the killings. That 
this was done in the midst of the Kosovo crisis is a measure 
of the depth of Washington's concern 
The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard expressed 
'deep concern' over the killings in Dili and the 'growing 
evidence' that Indonesian security forces had failed to act 
to stop it. 'I am very concerned at the way in which the 
situation has deteriorated, and the Indonesian government 
cannot escape responsibility for at least some of that, if not 
all of it.' [International Herald Tribune, 19 April.] 
The House of Commons was informed that Prime Min-
ister Tony Blair had sent a 'strong message' to President 
Habibie complaining about 'the recent appalling events in 
Liquisa and Dili where deaths occurred and protection for 
the people from the armed forces was not forthcoming'. 
[Statement by Minister of State Tony Lloyd, see Hansard, 
20 April] 
Speaking in the House of Lords in a debate on Indone-
sia and East Timor, Lord A vebury said Wiranto should 
relieve the commander of the forces in East Timor Major-
General Adam Damiri of his duties and Colonel Tono Su-
ratman as well as disbanding the militias and reducing 
ABRI's presemce. [Hansard, 22 April] 
UN talks: What kind of a UN presence? 
On 22 and 23 April, what was supposed to have been 
the final round in the UN-sponsored talks between Indone-
sia and Portugal, in preparation for the ballot, agreement 
was only reached on the autonomy proposal. While it was 
continued on page 24 
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Indigenous peoples join forces 
More than two hundred representatives of indigenous people from all parts of the archipelag~ ~eld a 
• r karta to share exneriences and draw up a common programme to protect their inter-congress m Ja r . h · · · ht 
ests against mining compa?ies, lo~ge~s and development pro1ects and restore t eir sovereign rig s 
over land expropriated against their wishes. 
The week-long Congress held 
in March was a milestone in the 
history of indigenous people who 
for decades have confronted a 
powerful Indonesian state that 
looks upon them as backward 
and in need of modernisation. 
Agreement was reached by the 
231 delegates to set up an or-
ganisation called AMAN (the 
name means 'safe' in Indone-
sian), the Alliance of Indigenous 
Peoples . of the Archipelago. By 
not using Indonesia in the name, 
they got round the question of 
state boundaries which are re-
jected by a number of West Pap-
uan and Acehnese groups. 
Q' 
I 
It was a colourful event with 
many delegates attending in tra-
dition dress, sparkling with en-
thusiasm at being participants in_ 
this milestone event. At the root 
of their problems is the contempt 
held for their land rights by the 
Demo in Parliament by indigenous women 
Indonesian state based on a Constitution that ignores peo-
ple's rights to forests and giv~s prim.acy to state interests 
over traditional land ownership. Indigenous people have 
long suffered the ignominy of being called 'suku-suku 
terasing' which means 'alienated' o~ 'isolated tribes', ~ if 
they need to be brought i.nto the m~mstream .of Indonesia~ 
(that is to say, Javanese lifestyles), m tune with ~he twenti-
eth century. In practice this has meant impovenshment of 
indigenous people whose lands have been grabbed for de-
velopment projects, dams, plantations and mines. 
Minister confronted 
In attendance at one of the sessions was the Minister for 
Agrarian Affairs, Hasan Basri Durin, who, according t~ 
one columnist 'looked pale and was rendered speechless 
by the grievances voiced from the plat~orm_. One d~legate, 
Chief Tengkanai Neratai of the Kubu tnbe m Jamb1, South 
Sumatra, dressed in a red loincloth, said: 'We are suffering 
because our lands and forests have vanished.' His people 
now control only one tenth of the 300,000 to 400,~00 ~ec­
tares of their forested land along the Batanghan River, 
much of which has been seized for forestry concessions, 
and agricultural and transmigration sites. 'They never 
asked our permission,' he protested. 
L.B. Dinggit, chief of the Dayak Bentian tribe in East 
Kalimantan, was awarded the prestigious 1997 Goldman 
Environmental Prize in San Francisco for his efforts to pre-
serve the forested areas of his homeland. But the governor 
of the province refused to welcome this award. Instead, 
Chief Dinggit was charged with a criminal offence for al-
legedly forging signatures and given a six-y~Rr sentence. 
He told the conference he had acted to defer,,! .iis people's 
right to the land against a company, PT Kalhod Utama, 
which was granted a forest concession of about 1,400 
square kilometres in 1982 that was transformed into profit-
able industrial forests. 
Noer Fauzi, chair of the Agrarian Reform Consortium, 
told the Congress that virtually unrestricted access to for-
ests occupied by indigenous peoples all over the country 
had led to a free-for-all land grab in which govemment-
made laws reigned supreme. For the government, forests 
were important for their contribution to economic growth 
and national security, in stark contrast to forest peoples for 
whom they provide secure livelihoods and sound, well-
tested methods to maintain sustainability. 
continued on page 24 
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Basuki Resobowo, a man against the stream 
On 4January1999 Basuki Resobowo died peacefully at an old age home in Amsterdam. He was 82, 
the last survivor of a generation of progressive painters like Soedjojono, Affandi and Hendra. 
Basuki was a colour/ ul figure and his life was marked by a combination of painter and political ac-
tivist. 
Basuki was a prominent member of the PKI, the Indo-
nesian Communist Party and is one of the last surviving 
members of the Central Committee of the Party. In October 
1965, he was in China to attend the 1 October celebrations 
and due to the political upheaval he was unable to return 
home. Ever since, he has been a political refugee/activist. 
In 1970 he moved to Europe, obtained refugee status in 
(West) Germany but became active in Holland and joined 
several groups like Gerakan Demi Demokrasi dan Hak 
Azasi Manusia and Front Demokrasi Indonesia. He was an 
editor of the Demi Demokrasi magazine and attended sev-
eral international conferences on behalf of these move-
ments. 
Basuki was involved in several solidarity groups in 
Europe and supported the Komittee Indonesie in the Neth-
erlands as well as T APOL. Many of the political cartoons 
published in TAPOL Bulletin in the '70s and '80s were his. 
He was also a skilful creator of political posters and the 
very first posters used at public meetings for East Timor 
and in the campaign for the release of Indonesian political 
prisoners were designed by him. In 1992 he joined a hun-
ger strike of Indonesian student activists in protest against 
the threatened execution of political prisoners being held in 
Indonesian prisons. 
Basuki devoted most of his time to painting and most of 
his works reflect intense disgust with the situation in Indo-
nesia and his leftist political views. There was a distinct 
Basuki style in all his works. He was proud to be a com-
munist but was frustrated by the lack of action by his fel-
low political refugees in Holland and Germany. Many fel-
low activists in Europe are proud owners of one of 
Basuki's painting. I myself have a powerful painting of the 
Tanjung Priok bloodbath of 1984. Most of his paintings 
would not sit well in the homes of respectable middle-class 
families. He held several exhibitions, the last one being in 
Amsterdam in 1995; they were always well attended. 
Besides painting, he was a prolific writer. During his 
stay in Holland he wrote an autobiography, a novel called 
Karmiatun, Perempuan Indonesia, a comic book on Cut 
Nyak Din an Acehnese heroine of the anti-Dutch struggle, 
and a political essay entitled Bercermin di Muka Kaea -
seniman, seni dan masyarakat. I had the good fortune to 
have met Pak Bas soon after his arrival in Europe. To-
gether, we attended many meetings, organised many dem-
onstrations and had many discussions. He was a humble, 
stubborn and highly committed person and always sided 
with the underdog, as expressed in his article in TAPOL 
Bulletin No. 61 , January 1984. 
Basuki was a founding member of LEKRA, the cultural 
organisation linked to the PKI. LEKRA was the most in-
fluential cultural organisation in the fifties and had many 
important artists among its members, including the writer 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, the painter Sudjojono, the film-
maker Bachtiar Siagian, the poet Rivai Apin and many 
others. During the period of Guided Democracy of the 
early sixties, LEKRA was involved in fierce polemical 
disputes with more liberal and right-wing artists, strongly 
propagating the line of ' Politics to the Fore'. The polemics 
became very heated and after the military takeover, many 
LEKRA members ended up in prison or concentration 
camps, not a few of whom died as victims of Suharto ter-
ror. 
Basuki was never a typical card-carrying communist. 
More an artist than a professional politician he always 
lived as a bohemian par excellence. But two years ago be-
cause of growing difficulties coping with old age, he had to 
be taken to a nursing home. 
He was also a founding member of PERFINI , a film 
company run largely by members of the PSI and Masyumi, 
two political parties who clashed with the PKI. He was 
involved in the production of several legendary films 
made in of the early fifties, including Krisis and Tangan-
Tangan Yang Kotor. These black-and-white films were in 
the tradition of the Italian neo-realist movies of that era. 
Few of these films are now extant; neglect and deliberate 
destruction during Suharto's Orde Baru wreaked lasting 
damage to the Indonesian cinema. 
In 1965 Basuki directed a movie commemorating the 
45th anniversary of the PKI, very few people have ever 
seen the film , copies may still be available in Beijing. 
Basuki's early days 
Basuki regarded himself as anak Betawi (a Jakarta boy) 
because he lived for more than 35 years in the city, but he 
was born in Lampung, South Sumatra where his father was 
a civil servant in the Dutch administration. In the thirties he 
joined the Taman Siswa movement, a nationalist move-
ment which placed special emphasis on education. 
Through Taman Siswa, Basuki was radicalised and became 
part of the anti-colonial movement. He joined the commu-
nist party during the Japanese occupation and stuck to his 
leftist political convictions to the end. People in Amster-
dam still remember him carrying a huge banner saying 
Hidup PK!, 'Long live the PK! ' in one of the many anti-
Suharto rallies. 
Hundreds of people, young and old, attended Basuki's 
cremation. He was a source of inspiration for many of us 
and his fighting spirit is like a rock in the ocean. We all 
miss you, Pak Bas. • 
Liem Soei Liong 
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When disputes were taken to court by the rightful land 
owners, it was usually ineffective. 'The dispute between 
the Dayak Bentian and the government symbolised the he-
gemony of state laws over traditional community laws,' he 
said. [Jakarta Post, 7 April] 
Women delegates act together 
One of the most impressive events of the Congress was 
the coming together of the women delegates to compare 
notes about their specific problems and to agree on the 
formation of a women's organisation, Alliance of Indige-
nous Women of the Archipelago. One of their grievances 
was directed at their own communities. Complaints about 
the oppression of women in traditional societies drew con-
siderable attention. The point was driven home by the fact 
that less than ten per cent of the delegations attending the 
Congress were women. 
The women directed their anger in particular at the gov-
emment' s family planning programme under which pre-
scribed methods of birth control are imposed. Matea 
Mamoyau from the Komoro tribe in West Papua com-
plained that even though they have their own safe tradi-
tional methods of birth control, 'we were herded like cattle 
to the health centres (where) the doctors and nurses forced 
us to use IUDs, implants or swallow pills.' Some of these 
methods have dangerous side-effects which is not the case 
with traditional methods. 
The women also complained about government projects 
continued from page 21 
agreed that the ballot would be on 8 August, agreement on 
the far more critical issues of security and the modalities 
for the voting were postponed until 5 May as Foreign 
Minister Alatas was unable to accept proposals made by 
Portugal without first consulting Jakarta. 
The critical question at issue is the nature of the UN's 
presence before and during the voting. In a statement in 
March, East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao 
said that conditions on the ground had deteriorated to such 
an extent - mind you, this was before the Liquisa and Dili 
tragedies - that a UN peace-keeping force would be 
needed. However, Alatas told the press in New York that 
'this has never been discussed' and that 'the main respon-
sibility will be shouldered by Indonesia'. The secretary-
general' s special ambassador on East Timor, Jamsheed 
Marker, agreed, saying: 'We have taken the word and the 
understanding of the Government of Indonesia that peace-
ful conditions will prevail.' [Transcript of Press Confer-
ence at UN Headquarters, 23 April] 
On 27 April, the Australia Prime Minister John Howard 
held talks with Habibie at which the central issue was the 
UN presence. Habibie told Howard that Indonesia would 
allow UN police advisers in to help monitor the ballot. This 
is totally unsatisfactory. First, monitoring the ballot is not 
the same as safeguarding security. Second, the agreed 
number of police was 'so small that it was strictly a to-
kenistic exercise'. [Australian Financial Review. 28 April] 
Whether agreement is reached on the nature of the UN 
presence depends on the 5 May UN talks. If Habibie's of-
fer is accepted, it will be a grave betrayal of the hopes of 
the East Timorese for a ballot free of the murc.terous terror 
being inflicted on them by ABRI and the para-militaries. * 
and companies that take over indigenous Ianci for planta-
tions, timber estates and mines which invariably marginal-
ise women. 
'We do not recognise the state' 
The Congress ended with the adoption of a declaration 
which demanded an outright end of abuses against them 
and respect by the state for their sovereignty. It said that 
there was no place for a uniform policy because of the di-
versity of the people in the archipelago .. 'If the state does 
not recognise us, we also do not recognise the state,' it 
said. 
A basic statement of views was also adopted which said 
that 'customary institutions have been tom apart by the 
imposition of regional and village administration applied 
uniformly' based on the 1974 law on regional administra-
tion. 'The imposed concept of the village has led to ex-
traordinary conflicts,' the statement said, while state con-
trol of resources 'has become a powerful tool ~o eradicate 
the sovereignty of indigenous peoples'. 
The demands included an end to such terms as 'isolated 
tribes' and 'state-owned land, a return of political sover-
eignty of the indigenous peoples, the revoking of all laws 
denying their sovereignty, an end to military intervention 
leading to violence, particularly towards women, and the 
correction of all abuses of basic rights'. The Congress de-
manded the repeal of a number of laws including those on 
land, mining and forestry exploitation. It also stressed that 
all government or private programme involving land 
should entail consultation with indigenous peoples, in such 
matters as transmigration, mining and forestry exploitation. 
[Jakarta Post, 22 March] * 
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